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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how Maori should frame a claim to petroleum before the 
Waitangi Tribunal. The paper contains a summary of the relevant Treaty 
principles to apply in a claim to petroleum. Particular focus is placed on the right 
of development and its status. 
The paper then discusses the possible submissions Maori claimants may make. 
Specifically, the paper outlines a binary claim to petroleum; first, that petroleum is 
an incidence of land, over which Maori have rangatiratanga, and second, that 
petroleum itself is a taonga of Maori. The paper highlights the issues with respect 
to both onshore and offshore petroleum resources and measures the actions of the 
Crown against the Treaty principles. Finally the paper considers whether any 
rights have been extinguished by statute or Crown action. 
The nature of such a claim is relatively novel. It is difficult to predict how the 
Tribunal will receive a claim to petroleum. It is the tentative conclusion of this 
paper that a claim to petroleum as an incidence of Maori land will be accepted. 
The vesting of this petroleum in the Crown without compensation for, 
consultation with, or the consent of Maori is a breach of the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi. Compensation should be recommended. 
WORD COUNT: 14,103 (excluding footnotes). 
I INTRODUCTION 
"Farewell; hold fast to the land, however small it may be." 1 
Long before white settlers arrived in New Zealand, Maori noticed a thick, dark 
and greasy substance floating on the sea around Taranaki. The local tribes 
accounted for the phenomenon and the accompanying unusual odour by legend.2 
They believed that an atua, or spirit, had drowned in the ocean and was still 
undergoing decomposition.3 
They were not far off the mark. In 1865 white settlers started exploring the region 
of Taranaki .4 As a result of the decomposition of mineral deposits over thousands 
of years, Taranaki is an area rich in petroleum and natural gas.5 Taranaki is now 
New Zealand's major commercial energy region, and companies are exploring the 
value of petroleum resources throughout the country. 6 Petroleum resources are 
invaluable today. Almost every man-made product, from clothes to computers to 
cars, relies on petroleum itself or a derivative of petroleum.7 
However a claim to petroleum by Maori has a significance beyond economic 
value. Maori are claiming back their rangatiratanga, guaranteed to Maori by the 
Treaty of Waitangi. Petroleum is a part of the land. Pre-European Maori had a 
holistic world-view; creation is one total, united entity. 8 The land could not be 
separated from the rivers, the air, the subsoil, the minerals within that subsoil. 
Land is their ancestry, their culture base, their source of mana. Thus to take away 
a part of Maori land was to take a lot. It is redress of this grievance for which 
Maori are fighting in a claim to petroleum. 
This paper outlines what form a Maori claim to petroleum before the Waitangi 
Tribunal may take. Part II of the paper outlines the jurisdiction of the Waitangi 
Tribunal. Part III looks at the basic points of the claim. Parts IV addresses the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi which the Tribunal must apply in this claim. 
Parts V and VI focus on the status of development as a principle of the Treaty. 
The paper will then examine the substantive parts of a claim to onshore and 
offshore petroleum respectively.9 The issues regarding the valid extinguishment of 
any Treaty or aboriginal rights are then examined in Part XII. The paper will not 
suggest what form a Tribunal recommendation might or should take, but it does 
speculate as to whether the Tribunal will recommend redress. 
1Per Aperehama Te Reiroa, in Chiefs of Hauraki to McLean, 27 November 1857 "Papers Relative 
to the Probability of Finding Gold at the Waikato and the Thames" AJHR, 863, D-8, 3 . 
21 D Henry, Oil Fields of New Zealand (London, 1911), 9. 
3Interview with Professor John Collen of the Geography Department of Victoria University of 
Wellington, 24 May 1999. 
41 D Henry, Oil Fields of New Zealand (London, 1911), 10. 
5References to "petroleum", "oil and/or gas" and "hydrocarbons" refer to the petroleum resource 
generally for the purposes of this essay. 
6Paydirt ' s New Zealand Petroleum Handbook (Louthean Publishing Pty Ltd, 1999). 
7lnterview with Professor John Collen of Geography Department of Victoria University of 
Wellington, 24 May 1999. 
8Waitangi Tribunal Muriwh enua Fishing Report - Wai 22 (Department of Justice, Wellington, 
1988) 179 [Muriwhenua Fishing Report]. 
90nshore petroleum is that within the 12 mile territorial limits of New Zealand . 
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II JURISDICTION OF THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL 
The Waitangi Tribunal (the Tribunal) derives its jurisdiction from the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975 (the 1975 Act). In a nutshell, the Tribunal was established to 
observe and confirm the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (the Treaty ). 10 To do 
this, the Tribunal may make recommendations on claims relating to the Treaty in 
practice and whether particular matters are inconsistent with the Treaty's 
principles. 11 Section 2 of the 1975 Act directs the Tribunal to refer to the Treaty as 
set out in English and Maori. 12 Thus the Tribunal has a true focus on the principles 
of the Treaty. 
A claim to the Tribunal must comply with section 6 of the 1975 Act. The 
claimant/s must be Maori and affected prejudicially by any legislation,13 Crown 
policy or Crown practice or Crown action, 14 that same legislation, policy or action 
being or having been inconsistent with the Treaty. If a claim is well-founded, the 
Tribunal may recommend to the Crown that "action be taken to compensate for or 
remove the prejudice or to prevent other persons from being similarly affected in 
the future". 15 The Tribunal's recommendations do not legally bind the Crown. 16 
Tribunal decisions are, however, well respected. 17 
The Tribunal is undoubtedly the preferred forum for such an investigation; 
claimants may need to present customary unwritten stories, waiata, perhaps even 
carvings to support their claim. The Waitangi Tribunal Act 1975 allows parties to 
submit evidence of this nature to a greater extent than the courts. 18 
III THE CLAIM AND ALLEGED BREACHES 
A claim to petroleum would begin with the assertion by the claimants that all 
petroleum within their land and sea based territory without seaward boundary are 
taonga and protected by the Treaty of Waitangi for the benefit of the claimants. 19 
Using the Treaty and/or the doctrine of aboriginal title, claimants should argue 
that tino rangatiratanga and rights analogous to ownership rights over petroleum 
belong to Maori. 
'°Taken from the preamble to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
11The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 5. 
12Both versions of the Treaty as in the First Schedule of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 arc 
attached in Appendix 1. 
13The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6(1). 
14The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6. 
15The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6(3). 
16Pursuant to s 8B of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, in conjunction with ss 27-27D of the State-
Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the Tribunal can give a binding order fro the resumption of land 
transferred to a State-owned enterprise in certain defined circumstances. 
17Praise for the Tribunal ' s innovative procedures and well-written reports abound. See generally A 
Shields (cd) Brooker's Resource Management Act (Brookers, Wellington, 1991) para 1.03 
(updated 16 August 1996) [Brooker's RMA ]. 
18See generally Richard Boast "The Waitangi Tribunal : Conscience of a Nation or Just Another 
Court?" 16 Univ NSW Law Rev 223. 
19See the Ngati Kahungunu Statement of Claim, attached at Appendix I. 
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The claimants should allege that the Crown breached those rights and the Treaty 
by: failing to recognise Maori rangatiratanga over petroleum, failing to consult 
Maori upon introduction of the Petroleum Act 1937 and Crown Minerals Act 
1991 ("the legislation"), failing to acknowledge that the legislation was and is 
contrary to the Treaty, and failing to compensate for the purported extinguishment 
of Maori rights. Thus the claimants must prove that these actions are inconsistent 
with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
IV THE PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY 
There are two versions of the Treaty of Waitangi. 20 The English and the Maori 
versions translate somewhat differently .2 1 To focus on the written content of one 
or the other would be to ignore and negate the true spirit and meaning of the 
Treaty. The Treaty is an agreement made between two parties, one which had an 
oral culture, the other a literal culture. To understand the meaning of the Treaty, 
consideration must be given to what was said and agreed to as well as what was 
written down. 22 
Thus the Treaty was a political blueprint for the future, 23 a plan to forge a working 
relationship between two peoples. The Treaty must therefore be seen in light of 
the parties' objectives. The Tribunal must "steer a middle ground" between the 
two Treaties and the two parties' expectations.24 
The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 recognises this by requmng the Tribunal to 
measure State action against the principles of the Treaty. The Tribunal has 
commented at length on what these principles are.25 As principles, exact 
definitions are neither possible nor appropriate. The existing body of principles 
considered by the Tribunal and the courts is far from static or settled.26 The 
principles do not negate the literal terms of the Treaty, they enlarge the terms.27 
The principles of the Treaty are ventilated by both the document itself and the 
surrounding experience.28 
20 Attached at Appendix II. 
21 See generally Cooke P in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 
(CA) [New Zealand Maori Council]. 
22Waitangi Tribunal The Te Roroa Report (Brooker and Friend Ltd , Wellington, 1992) 42, as cited 
in AL Mikaere & D V Williams "Maori Issues" [1992] NZRLR 152, 163. 
23Waitangi Tribunal Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report - Wai 27 (Brooker and Friend Ltd, 
Wellington, 1992) 269; 5 WTR 689 [Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries]. 
24Waitangi Tribunal The Radio Spectrum Management and Development Final Report - Wai 776 
(Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1999) 37 [Spectrum Report]. 
25The Court of Appeal has also formulated specific Treaty principles. See New Zealand Maori 
Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
26See generally Brooker's RMA, above n 17, 3.03 (Updated 2 February 1994). It should be noted 
that principles formulated by the Tribunal are not binding. Only those principles established by the 
courts are binding. See also SE Kenderdine "The Treaty Jurisprudence" in Applications under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ Law Society Seminar, 1993), 7-24. 
27Muriwhenua Fishing Report, above n 8, 213. 
28The Tribunal has approved the view of the Canadian courts in R v Taylor and Williams (1981) 62 
CCC (2d) 227, which held that surrounding circumstances and contemporary experience may be 
considered notwithstanding the fact that the treaty is technically clear and certain. 
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The principles of the Treaty guide claimants and the Crown alike to frame and 
develop their arguments. The principles define and enhance the terms of the 
Treaty. The principles also provide the standards against which alleged breaches 
by Crown are measured.29 The principles can also be useful in deciding whether a 
remedy should be recommended and if so, what form it should take. 
This sprawling nature means that the principles do not slot nicely in to an essay 
aiming for a logical structure. The principles hover over and permeate every facet 
of the claim. Thus, before reviewing the substantive arguments, the paper will 
discuss the principles of the Treaty relevant to a claim to petroleum. 
A Sovereignty in Exchange for Rangatiratanga 
This principle is referred to as over-arching and far-reaching; the most 
fundamental of the principles.30 It recognises that the cession of sovereignty to the 
Crown was in exchange for the protection by the Crown of Maori rangatiratanga, 
or full tribal authority and control over their lands, forests, fisheries, and other 
valued possessions for so long as they wished to retain them. Therefore, " the right 
to govern which it acquired was a qualified right". 31 
The Crown must act towards Maori "fairly, equitably and in accordance with the 
high standards of justice that a fiduciary relationship entails."32 In the case of Te 
Runanga O Wharekauri Re Kohu Incorporated v Attorney-General, Cooke P 
found that the Treaty supported a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown.33 Cooke 
P accepted the approach in both the United States and Canada that the ideas of 
fiduciary duties and constructive trust are necessary parts of protection and 
partnership. 
The principle is the essence of articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty. It is often called the 
principle of protection. The principle contains what could be described as a subset 
of principles. Some reports refer to the concepts in this subset as individual 
principles, but they are essentially inherent to and derived from this essential 
principle of protection.34 These concepts will be outlined next. 
1 Duty of active protection 
Of course, the Crown 's duty of active protection applies to the interests 
guaranteed to Maori under article 2 of the Treaty. Crown needs to ensure Maori 
can use, enjoy and protect their resources in accordance with their spiritual and 
cultural beliefs. Any exercise of the Crown' s right to govern must not impinge on 
these rights. The degree of protection to be given to Maori resources depends on 
the nature and value of the resource to Maori. 35 
29Muriwhenua Fishing Report, above n 8, 212. 
30Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries above n 23, 269; 5 WTR 689. 
31Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries above n 23, 5 WTR 269. 
32Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Land Report - Wai 45 (GP Publications, Wellington, 1997) 385 
{Muriwhenua Land Report]. 
· 
3Te Runanga O Wharekauri Re Kohu Jnco,porated v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 , 306 
(CA). 
34The author does not mean to imply that the principles are in any way "sub" as inferior. 
35Waitangi Tribunal Ngawha Geothermal Resource Report - Wai 304 (Brooker & Friend Ltd, 
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2 Right of tribal self-regulation 
The Tribunal has stated that the right of tribal self management is one part of 
rangatiratanga. Rangatiratanga, or "full exclusive and undisturbed" possession 
(the English version), is seen as all rights of authority, management and control.36 
Maori were guaranteed not only possession of their taonga but the right to control 
both their own uses and the rights of others to the taonga in accordance with 
Maori cultural preferences.37 The Crown can enact in the interests of conservation 
and the wider public interest in preservation of the resource .38 But this Crown 
right must not impinge on the exercise of tribal management by Maori over their 
resources. 
3 Duty to consult 
If the Crown intends to act or make a decision which may affect the 
rangatiratanga of an iwi or hapu over their taonga, the Crown must discuss the 
matter to the fullest extent practicable with Maori.39 If Crown does not consult 
those who appreciate the nature and significance of the taonga, the Crown may 
not realise what rangatiratanga over the taonga entails. Thus the Crown will not be 
able to actively protect this Maori Treaty right.40 
4 Right of redress 
If the Crown fails to protect tino rangatiratanga in any of these ways, the Crown is 
obligated to make redress.41 
B The Principle of Partnership 
The principle of partnership requires the two Treaty partners to act towards each 
other reasonably and with the utmost good faith. This principle results from the 
bi-partite nature of the Treaty. It is a covenant which establishes a continuing, 
temporally flexible relationship defined by an interplay between kawanatanga and 
rangatiratanga. 
In the Manakau Report the Tribunal stated that the precise terms of the 
partnership were yet to be worked out. That appears to be the case today as well. 
In Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General,42 Cooke P stated that 
"partnership certainly does not mean that every asset or resource in which the 
Wellington, 1993)100-101 [Ngawha ]; sec also Waitangi Tribunal Preliminary Report on the Te 
Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims - Wai 153 (Brookers, Wellington, 1993) 40. 
36Waitangi Tribunal The Whanganui River Report (GP Publications Ltd, Wellington, 1999) 338 
{Whanganui River]. 
7Waitangi Tribunal Motonui-Waitara Report - Wai 6 (Wellington, 1983) 51. 
38Muriwhenua Fishing Report above n 8, 230-232. 
39Ngawha above n 35, 101-102. 
40If the Crown has knowledge sufficient to enable it to have proper regard to the Treaty, then 
Crown has no duty to consult. Per Cooke Pin New Zealand Maori Council, above n 21 , 674-5. 
41 Per Somers Jin New Zealand Maori Council, above n 21 , 693. 
42Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA) [Tainui]. 
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Maori have some justifiable claim to share must be divided equally".
43 Cooke P 
justified this by stating that one party may have made the greater contribution to 
the available asset base. It is submitted, as an aside, that Cooke P neglected the 
fact that historically Maori were denied the means to contribute fully. 
The partnership principle also has offshoots. Other principles which derive from 
partnership are the concepts of mutual benefit and development. The former 
concept allows Maori to share in the benefits of European colonisation. This 
includes a right to new technologies. The latter concept, which is very similar to 
the idea of mutual benefit, deserves fuller treatment. 
V DEVELOPMENT 
"At its making all lay in the future."44 
Justice Somers was, of course, referring to the Treaty and its ability to adapt. The 
courts and the Tribunal have waxed lyrically about the character of the Treaty as a 
living document. The Treaty is a covenant which does not petrify rights as they 
existed at 1840, but rather provides for "future growth and development".
45 Such 
comments justify the use of the principles of the Treaty to interpret its terms. It 
also justifies the recognition of a right of development under the Treaty. 
A Principle or Sub-principle? 
The majority judgment in the Spectrum Report included the right of development 
among the principles of the Treaty. The Tribunal in the N gai Tahu Fisheries 
Report stated that "inherent in the Treaty of Waitangi is a right of development".
46 
Whether a development right is an individual principle or whether it exists within 
a subset to the principle of partnership is not yet established. The 'principle' of 
development is clearly linked to and derived from the principle of partnership. 
Regardless of what exact semantic label it is given, some right of development 
was clearly contemplated and expected by both Treaty partners. But what exactly 
is the scope of this right to develop? 
B The Three Roles of Development 
The concept of development and its relationship with the Treaty is, to be frank, 
confusing. The present author submits that 'development' plays three different 
roles. 
1 Role one - flexibility of the Treaty 
At one level development refers to the Treaty and its application in society and 
43Tainui, above n 42, 527. 
44Per Somers J in New Zealand Maori Council above n 21, 692. 
45Per Bisson J in New Zealand Maori Council above n 21, 715. 
46Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, above n 23. 
7 
law. This is the role which demands a principled approach to the Treaty,47 and was 
expanded on in Part IV above. 
2 Role two - the right to develop a right 
On a second level, 'development' encompasses the rights of Maori and the Crown 
on behalf of New Zealand to develop their resources. It is this role to which the 
rhetoric of 'frozen rights' and the principle of 'mutual benefit' refer. This paper 
will refer to this role as the right of development.48 
The Tribunal and even the Crown have generally accepted a Maori developmental 
right in regard to properties specified in the Treaty. 49 These properties include 
land, fisheries and forests. Thus Maori need not only fish from canoes with flax 
lines and hooks of bone. 
Whether this right extends to "other properties" not specified in the Treaty is not 
established, but is strongly arguable. It must be remembered that the Treaty ' s 
spirit floats, it is not captured. Nor should it be. 
The right to development is inextricably linked to the other principles of the 
Treaty, particularly the principle of partnership and protection. When claiming a 
right to develop a resource, claimants should argue that not to allow full rights to 
exploit the resource is inconsistent with these fundamental principles and their 
related concepts.50 
The Tribunal has referred to the issue of development as creating a tension 
between conservationists and developers. The Tribunal concludes that this is a 
"necessary and beneficial battle amongst any people who neither wish to stagnate, 
nor through depletion, to starve". Surely the principles of protection and 
partnership allow an expansive right of Maori to develop those resources over 
which Maori have rangatiratanga guaranteed under article 2 of the Treaty. 
In 1984 Koro Wetere, then Minister of Maori Affairs, stated that "the pace of 
development for Maori had to be two steps to everyone else's one, if Maori were 
to catch up with non-Maori". 5 1 This leads neatly to the next role of development. 
3 Role three - development simpliciter 
There is a third role, but the present author submits that, at this stage, 
development is just auditioning. The role is a spin-off, to continue the wordplay, 
from the principle of development. It is widely accepted that the development of 
47The present author acknowledges that the language difficulties regarding the two versions of the 
Treaty are also the reason behind this focus on Treaty principles. 
48This is to keep the discussion simple, not to assert that development in this sense is a right rather 
than a principle. 
49The courts have not referred directly to a right of development but have impliedly recognised the 
principle within the principles of partnership and the ability of the Treaty to adapt to new 
circumstances. 
50Muriwhenua Fishing Report above n 8, 163, 184. 
5 1Koro Wetere at the 1984 Maori Economic Development Summit Conference as quoted in the 
Spectrum Report, above n 24, 42. 
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Maori culturally, socially and economically needs encouragement. The tragedies 
of the past and the imposition of a foreign way of life have undeniably 
disadvantaged Maori.52 But when Maori claim a Treaty right to a resource, what 
scope does this general need for protection of Maori development have ? 
In other words, does the Treaty of Waitangi secure the principle of development 
of a right, or does it extend to the right to develop in a general sense, a right to 
development simpliciter? Can the principle of development found a claim to 
petroleum on its own; in other words, as a claim separate to the submissions that 
petroleum is an incident of land or a taonga?53 Could Maori claim that their right 
of development simpliciter, in conjunction with the principle of good faith and 
mutual benefit and a right to adapt to new circumstances, protects and guarantees 
Maori an equitable share of every and all resources that New Zealand has to offer, 
regardless of whether Maori knew of or used those resources at 1840?54 
The general public today would instinctively answer in the negative. But if the 
answer is no, Maori can only claim mana over those resources known of at 1840. 
Sure, Maori will have the right to benefit from new technology to develop those 
resources, but this is hardly what one would expect from a Treaty which 
established a partnership. It can hardly be what the Maori expected at 1840 either. 
Whether development will get this part depends on the casting powers of the 
Tribunal and the mindset of the government. The paper will now briefly outline 
the direction the Tribunal has taken thus far. 
VI TOWARDS A PRINCIPLES-ONLY APPROACH? 
A The Interplay Between Article Two and the Treaty Principles 
The Tribunal has referred frequently to the principles of the Treaty. That is the 
purpose of their establishment. But comments on the relationship between the 
written terms and the principles, while prolific, are somewhat ambiguous. In the 
Muriwhenua Fishing Report on fisheries, the Tribunal stated that a review of 
Crown actions based upon a literal approach to the Treaty terms is not the proper 
approach. The Tribunal rejected this approach and favoured the broader 
construction according to the principles. Again, in ambiguous terms, the Tribunal 
stated:55 
The essential task is not to apply the Treaty's literal words but to locate the correct 
principle. In that respect the words are most important, of course; but they are essential, 
not because they define the right but because they describe the principle that gives rise to 
it. 
52The Rt Hon Sir Douglas Graham recently claimed that Maori youth today "know and live" the 
grievances of their ancestors, and that this sense of being wronged is affecting their performance in 
the educational sector. Rt Hon Sir Douglas Graham, An Address to the Rotary District Conference, 
25 April 1999. 
53Again , it is acknowledged that the submissions of claimants never stand alone entirely - the other 
principles of the Treaty are fused into all branches of a claim. 
)
41840 is the year Maori ceded sovereignty to the Crown. The time of acquisition of sovereignty 
by a new power is the usual reference point used to establish the cut-off of traditional Maori 
customs. 
55Muriwhenua Fishing Report above n 8, 213. 
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Do these comments mean that the principles, though derived from the terms, can 
have practical effect without reference to them? Does the principle of partnership 
and the qualification on kawanatanga extend this far? The Muriwhenua Fishing 
Report approved rights to commercial fishing, saying that whether Maori used 
their fisheries commercially was not important. But nonetheless, the basic taonga -
their fisheries - was already established.56 Thus it is support for development in its 
second role - the right to develop a right - rather than the role three. 
B The Spectrum Report and Development 
1 The majority 
The judgment in the Spectrum Report gave the principles of partnership and 
development such a wide scope that it appears to allow Maori to claim natural 
resources simpliciter. The Tribunal did find that the spectrum was a taonga of 
sufficient value to acquire the protection under article 2's specific terms. But it 
must be acknowledged that the Tribunal found the spectrum a taonga on 
somewhat broad examples of usage. The judgment impliedly pushes the Treaty in 
the direction that allows for a right to develop in general, without having to 
confine that development to established taonga or properties under the Treaty. 
2 The minority 
In his dissent in the spectrum claim, Savage J espouses a persuasive and vigorous 
rejection of any general right to development. He wholeheartedly accepted the 
submission that Maori may develop those resources which they made customary 
and traditional use of prior to the Treaty. He wholeheartedly rejected the 
submission that the right of the partnership principle to develop to include 
resources not known about or used in a traditional manner at 1840. 
He rejected the latter submission as it was based on an unfounded and exaggerated 
interpretation of the partnership principle. A partnership, Savage stresses, is not a 
marriage.57 He agrees that Maori have a right to rangatiratanga without Crown 
intrusion, but that this right to rangatiratanga does not guarantee Maori an 
equitable and fair share in resources over and above those specifically referred to 
in article 2. His view was largely based on his belief that "the Treaty does not 
make promises of economic outcomes".58 To conclude, he asserts: 59 
We all accept or should accept that the Treaty is not locked in time or current knowledge 
or technological capacity. But it seems to me that the principle contended for by the 
claimants goes further to the point of attempting a new edition of the Treaty. 
The limitations Savage places on the general right to development find support in 
56 Although the scope in terms of whether it was a site-specific right etcetera was not. 
57Savage J is of course assuming that partners in marriage have equal shares in marital property. 
58The Spectrum Report above n 24, 61. With all due respect, the author notes that surely the claim 
was not to a security of a right to guaranteed financial outcomes, but the security of a right 
full stop. 
-9 ·' The Spectrum Report above n 24, 64. 
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the comments of Cooke P. In Te Runanganui o Te Jka Whenua Inc Sac v A-G,60 
Cooke P stated that the Treaty is a living instrument. Cooke P continued, 
however, by arguing that even with the most liberal interpretation, Maori 
customary and Treaty rights "could not sensibly be regarded today as meant to 
safeguard rights to generate electricity ."61 Thus the President of the Court of 
Appeal dismissed any implication that a resource not known of at 1840 deserves 
protection. 
Other comments from the former President of the Court of Appeal could support 
Savage's idea that partnership is not a marriage. In the Tainui case,62 Cooke P 
stated that the principle of partnership does not require equal division of 
resources. However, Cooke P was referring to the division of properties fitting the 
protection of article 2, not resources completely unknown of by Maori in 1840. It 
should be remembered that if a right to resource development simpliciter is 
established, Maori would probably be granted an equitable share, not necessarily 
an equal share. 
C Summary 
The argument is circular, and is indeed viciously so. Treaty principles are derived 
essentially from the cession of kawanatanga by Maori and the guarantee of Maori 
tino rangatiratanga by the Crown - two of the express terms of the Treaty. Tino 
rangatiratanga was guaranteed over all taonga of the Maori. At this stage, then, it 
appears that the principles cannot exist apart from the express terms, as their very 
existence stems from these express written terms. But then it must be asked: what 
constitutes " taonga"? How is taonga reconciled with "other properties"? Did the 
references to possession for as long as the Maori wish to retain them connote 
possession then and not possession of future goods and resources? This requires a 
consideration of the literal terms of both texts, of the understandings and 
expectations of both Maori and Pakeha and the spirit of the Treaty. In other 
words, a consideration of the principles of the Treaty. It appears that the principles 
are the very source of the express terms. 
It is the principle of partnership which is at the heart of the scope of development. 
The Tribunal in the Muriwhenua Fishing Report stated that the fiduciary 
undertakings of Crown are broader than the terms of the Treaty and assure that 
Maori survive and progress. The issue is, ultimately, whether the principle of 
partnership means a sharing of all resources. The hierarchy of and precise scope 
of the relationship between kawanatanga and rangatiratanga are the essential 
elements of partnership. It is interesting that whereas the authorities could have 
defined the relationship in terms of a trusteeship of guardian/ward proportions, 
they instead adopted the term "partnership" . 
The Treaty has been at issue before the courts and Tribunal for many years. Yet a 
coherent, consistent application of the Treaty 's founding principles has eluded 
such judicial experts. The list is certainly not finished. The Spectrum Report 
arguably does open wide the application of the principle of development and the 
60Te Runanganui o Te Jka Whenua Inc Soc v A-G [1994] 2 NZLR 21 (CA) [Te Jka Whenua ]. 
6 1 Te Jka Wh enua, above n 60, 25. 
62Tainui, above n 42, 527. 
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Treaty itself. With the claims submitted to the Tribunal coming thick and fast, it 
may not be long before development gets a call-back for a second audition. While 
a claim to petroleum may be successful relying on taonga and land-based 
arguments below, development may need to perform in a claim to offshore 
petroleum in particular. 
VII SUBMISSION ONE - ONSHORE PETROLEUM AS AN INCIDENT 
OF LAND 
Maori could claim that they had Treaty or aboriginal rights to petroleum as 
incidents of their land, over which they hold tino rangatiratanga under Article 2 of 
the Treaty. The vesting of petroleum ownership in the Crown would then be a 
potential breach of Treaty principles.63 
At this point, the author must clarify the interplay between aboriginal and Treaty 
rights. Essentially claims to aboriginal title are heard by the common law courts of 
New Zealand. The jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal, on the other hand, 
extends only to Treaty claims. Given the Tribunal 's jurisdiction, how can the 
claimants ask that the Tribunal address aboriginal rights? The Tribunal appears 
willing to hear claims based on aboriginal title alternatively with Treaty rights. 
The Tribunal has adopted the view that treaty rights and aboriginal rights exist 
side by side.64 In fact, the Treaty arguably grants Maori wider interest to land than 
aboriginal title. 65 Aboriginal title can be used as an interpretative guide, and can 
elucidate on the content of the Treaty right to land. 
A comprehensive review of aboriginal title law is unfortunately not within the 
scope of this paper.66 This section will only outline the jurisprudence on the 
doctrine of aboriginal title, using this doctrine to interpret the scope of the Treaty 
rights. The claimants may expand on the doctrine, as the claims laid before the 
Tribunal have argued protection of petroleum pursuant to both the Treaty and the 
doctrine of aboriginal title. 67 
A The Doctrine of Aboriginal Title 
1 General status 
63If the claimants can show that had their land not been unjustly confiscated by the Crown, they 
would still have tino rangatiratanga over those resources today. Unfortunately such an argument 
runs into problems with respect to the purported vesting of petroleum ownership in the Crown 
under the Petroleum Act 1937. Therefore the claimants need to show that the Crown's taking of 
petroleum itself is a breach of the Treaty. 
64RP Boast "Treaty Rights or Aboriginal Rights?" (1990) NZLJ 32, 34 [Treaty Rights] . 
65It should be noted here that the Treaty did not extinguish or cede aboriginal rights of the Maori . 
Some argue that the Treaty is merely declaratory of aboriginal rights. The Tribunal rejected this 
view in the Muriwhenua Fishing Report. The prevalent view, however, is that the Treaty enhances 
aboriginal rights and that the two exist side by side. Sec generally Treaty Rights, above n 63; 
Muriwhenua Fishing Report, above n 8,209. 
66The author will refer to articles on specific aboriginal title issues throughout the discussion . 
However for an excellent review of Canadian jurisprudence with reference to other jurisdictions, 
see William Flanagan "Piercing the Veil of Real Property" (1998) 24 Queen 's L.J. 307; Brian 
Slattery " Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can Bar Rev. 727. 
67For example, please refer to Ngati Kahungunu 's statement of claim attached in Appendix I. 
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Aboriginal rights attach to land and have their origin in the historic occupation of 
the land by certain peoples. New Zealand law clearly upholds the doctrine of 
aboriginal title.68 The courts first recognised aboriginal title as part of New 
Zealand law in 1847.69 It is generally accepted that aboriginal title, and the rights 
within that title, exist as a burden on the Crown's sovereignty over the land. In 
other words, the acquisition of sovereignty by a new power does not automatically 
extinguish aboriginal rights.70 Land held under aboriginal title is alienable only to 
the Crown.71 Aboriginal title is a matter of fact. 72 
These are about the only points regarding aboriginal title which can stated so 
assertively .73 The doctrine on aboriginal title is young yet the jurisprudence is both 
prolific and contentious.74 The source of the doctrine, the scope of the rights, the 
content of the title and other significant issues are still uncertain. 
2 Relationship between aboriginal rights and aboriginal title 
Aboriginal rights appear to exist along a spectrum. Where the rights of a particular 
native community lie on this spectrum depends on how these peoples used the 
land and the nature of their occupancy. At one end of the spectrum lies full, 
beneficial, aboriginal title to land. At the other end fall aboriginal rights to land, 
where the claimants have specific usage rights on the land, not title to the land 
itself. An example of an aboriginal right is the right to hunt, or to perform a 
traditional ritual.75 
3 Establishing aboriginal title 
In the recent case of Delgamuukw v B.C.,76 the Canadian Supreme Court discussed 
the content of aboriginal title.77 To prove aboriginal title, Lamer CJC required two 
main criteria. First, the claimants must have occupied the land prior to the 
68Te Runanganui o Te Jkawhenua v AG [1994] 2 NZLR 20 (CA), 23-4. Brooker's RMA, above n 
15, at TWl.05 (Updated 16 August 1996). 
69The Queen v Symonds [1847] NZPCC 387. 
70J Gavin Adlam "The Implications of the Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Rights for the Oil and 
Gas Industry" [1994] 4 OGLTR 126,129. 
7 1The Queen v Symonds [1847] NZPCC 387. 
72Paul McHugh The Aboriginal Rights of New Zealand Maori at Common Law (Cambridge, 
1987); see also Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) NZPCC 371, 382-383. 
73The author notes that even these statements are fuzzy around the edges. But is that not the nature 
of law? 
74McNeil states that the doctrine is "probably the most uncertain and contentious body of law in 
Canada". Kent McNeil "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights - What 's the Connection?" 35 
Alberta L. Rev. 117, 118. 
750r perhaps even the right to extract oil! The interplay between aboriginal title and aboriginal 
rights could, the author speculates, also be described in terms of sets and subsets, the rights being 
subsets of the superset that is aboriginal title. For a thorough view on the aboriginal spectrum see 
Kent McNeil "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What ' s the Connection?" (1997) 35 Alberta 
L Rev 117. 
76[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw]. 
77The native appellants in Delgamuukw claimed ownership of 58 OOO square kilometres of 
disputed territory. The Court ordered a new trial because of defects in the pleadings and the trial 
judge' s approach to oral evidence. Therefore the comments on aboriginal title may striclly be 
obiter. Even so, obiter from the Supreme Court of Canada are highly persuasive. 
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acquisition of sovereignty by the new power. Second, the occupancy must have 
been, before European sovereignty, exclusive.78 In establishing occupancy, the 
judiciary will consider both the common law view of physical occupation and the 
aboriginal perspective on occupancy and exclusivity. Of course, if these 
requirements are not satisfied, the claimants may still have a right which falls 
more towards the other end of the spectrum. 
4 Content of an aboriginal title 
It is not established whether aboriginal title is akin to the common law fee simple 
estate. Previous case law tended to categorise aboriginal title as a mere a 
usufructary right of enjoyment of the land according to the claimants' pre-
sovereignty traditions.79 
It is widely recognised that aboriginal title gives the native title holders full 
undisturbed rights to benefit from their land. In New Zealand it is argued that the 
aboriginal title held by Maori ( or Maori title) was closer to a freehold interest than 
in other jurisdictions.80 Governments treated Maori as owners of the entire country 
and this ownership could be extinguished only in the same way that a freehold 
interest could be extinguished. Aboriginal title could not, for example, be 
extinguished by an inconsistent Crown grant to a third party. 
5 Does aboriginal title to land include minerals? 
Furthermore, it is now said to be accepted that aboriginal title to land includes 
both surface and subsurface minerals. As stated in Delgamuukw, "aboriginal title 
encompasses exclusive use and enjoyment of land ... [including] mineral rights". 81 
United States jurisprudence on aboriginal title claims also sustain claims to 
minerals. In United States v Shoshone Tribe of Indians82 and Klamath and Moadoc 
Tribes,83 aboriginal title was held to extend to commercial exploitation of minerals 
and timber. In addition, compensation for the extinguishment of aboriginal title 
often included the value of minerals into account.84 It is significant that the federal 
government granted the native tribes subsurface rights to minerals even after the 
government realised that they could split ownership and give the tribes the surface 
estate only, reserving the subsurface estate for the government.85 In New Zealand, 
Cooke P has implied that Maori can have either aboriginal or Treaty rights to 
minerals.86 Cooke P stated that Maori knowledge and limited use of coal could 
78The court oullined the same requirements in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 
~MaboNo 2]. 
9St Catherine 's Milling and Lumber Co. v R (1885) 10 OR 196 (Ch). 
80Brooker's RMA , above n 17, para 1.05 (Updated 12 March 1999). 
81Delgamuukw, above n 76, affirming the Supreme Court decision in Blueberry River Indian Band 
v Canada [1995) 4 S.C.R. 344. 
82(1938) 304 US 111, 118 (SC) [Shoshone]. Though Shoshone involved rights given by treaty, the 
court decided that the claim to minerals and timber derived from an inherent aboriginal right rather 
than solely from the treaty. See Leshy "Indigenous Land Claims and Mineral Development" 
(1985) 8 UNSW Law J 271, 273-282 [Leshy). 
83(1938) 304 US 119 [Klamath]. 
84See generally Leshy, above n 82, 277-8; Raymond Cross "Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings 
and Preservation of Indian Country in the 21st Century" 40 Ariz Law Rev 425. 
85See Leshy, above n 82, 287-290. 
86Tainui Trust Board v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA). 
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establish coal as a taonga. 87 
B The Treaty Right to Land 
Article 2 of the Treaty guaranteed to Maori exclusive and full possession of their 
lands. The Maori version gave them tino rangatiratanga over their lands. This 
protection is to continue until the Maori voluntarily exercise their right to sell 
their land to the Crown. The Treaty is silent on ownership of minerals under the 
surface of that land. 
In defining the scope and content of land under article 2 of the Treaty again 
evokes consideration of the eternal interpretational issue. The correct approach is 
to interpret the article 2 protection of land using the principles of the Treaty. 
1 The principles 
The relevant Treaty principles will be summarised again. A central principle is 
that of partnership. Part of this partnership is the need to preserve Maori taonga 
and land. An important consequence of partnership, as recognised by the Tribunal 
in the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report,88 is the principle of mutual benefit. In 
recent years, the Tribunal and the courts have recognised a fiduciary obligation. 
The Crown is obligated to act in the best interests of Maori pursuant to the 
principles of the Treaty. The duty of the Crown is not merely passive but extends 
to active protection of Maori and the use of their lands and water to the fullest 
extent practicable.89 This rangatiratanga over Maori resources gives Maori full 
authority, control and management over their resources 
It is again helpful to look at North American jurisprudence, where principles of 
protection and fiduciary obligations also apply. 90 In Canada, the Crown has been 
held to owe fiduciary obligations to the native peoples due to the Crown's historic 
powers and responsibilities. These obligations have been held to require that the 
native peoples have full and undisturbed benefit of native land. 91 These fiduciary 
duties have also seen a number of recent settlements including subsurface mineral 
rights.92 
The United States Supreme Court in Shoshone considered a treaty which had 
reserved a mineral rich area of land (known to the Government to contain 
minerals) for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the tribe.93 The 
81Tainui Trust Board v Attorney-General (1989] 2 NZLR 513, 527-9. Curiously, Cooke P also 
implied that the Maori contribution to the coal industry, working as "a truck and a miner in the 
Huntly coalfields", is also relevant to their rights to the resource. 
88See N gai Tahu Sea Fisheries, above n 23, 273. 
89See the more expansive review of these principles at Part IV above. 
9°The Tribunal willingly hears evidence on the position of other jurisdictions with regard to 
aboriginal issues. See Muriwhenua Fisheries Report, above n 8, 168-173. 
9 1See R v Sparrow (1986) 36 DLR ( 4th) 246 (BC CA), (1990) 70 DLR (4th) 385 (SCC). 
92See the description of the Yukon and Northwest Territories contemporary claims settlements in 
Brian Crane "Native Rights and Resource Development in Canada" (1994) 2 Jnl of Energy and 
Nat Res L 407, 419. 
93See Shoshone, above n 82. 
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Supreme Court found, in light of that phrase and the policy of the government to 
deal fairly with native peoples according to their fiduciary duties, that minerals 
and standing timber were constituent elements of the land itself. As such, the tribe 
owned the minerals. 
2 Summary 
The Treaty principles can only lead to the conclusion that Maori are guaranteed all 
rights to their lands and any natural incidents. Maori must have rangatiratanga 
over minerals if they are guaranteed use of their land to the fullest extent possible. 
This is supported by the conclusive case law that aboriginal title includes 
minerals. Given that the Treaty promises something more than the aboriginal 
right, Treaty land must include minerals. The paper addresses the development of 
this right in Part X. 
If so, then again using the principles as the standard, Crown's taking of petroleum 
is arguably a breach of those principles and redress should be given. 
It is highly arguable that complete Crown ownership and control of the petroleum 
resource is inconsistent with the Treaty principle of partnership and protection. It 
may be a breach of Crown's fiduciary obligations to Maori. Crown may also be 
breaching the tribal right of self-regulation under the principle of protection. 
Crown may also not have discharged their duty to consult relevant Maori when 
considering the nationalisation of petroleum.94 
VIII SUBMISSION TWO - ONSHORE PETROLEUM AS TAONGA 
Maori could argue that the petroleum resource itself is a taonga. Article 2 of the 
Treaty guarantees Maori rangatiratanga over their taonga. The Waitangi Tribunal 
has commented extensively on the nature and definition of taonga in recent 
reports. 
A Taonga Described 
Taonga is best translated as "all valued customs and possessions" of Maori. 95 
Taonga can be those things which support or sustain other taonga. 96 Taonga are 
prized, protected and conserved by Maori, and are imbued with a sacredness and 
spirituality.97 Taonga can be material or non-material. 98 Land, fisheries, 99 
pounamu, 100 and the Maori language 101 are examples of generally accepted taonga 
94The Petroleum Act 1937, and also the continuance of nationalisation in the Crown Minerals Act 
1991. 
95Spectrum Report, above n 24, 9. For a comprehensive review of the meaning of taonga, see the 
Muriwhenua Fishing Report, above n 8, 173-181. 
96Waitangi Tribunal Claims Concerning the Allocation of Radio Frequencies - Wai 26 and Wai 
150 (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1990) [Radio Frequencies Report]. 
97Ngawha , above n 35, 20. 
98Ngawha , above n 35, 20. 
99See generally Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, above n 23 . 
100Greenstone. 
101New Zealand Maori Council, above n 21, 578. 
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protected under Article Two of the Treaty. 
To argue that petroleum is a taonga stands quite distinct from the other taonga 
found by the Tribunal. Twenty years ago, any claim to petroleum would have 
been dismissed as ridiculous, let alone a claim that petroleum was a taonga itself. 
Today, that view may be different. Of course, the success of such a claim will 
depend largely on the evidence presented by the claimants regarding the extent 
Maori valued the resource of petroleum, or if they valued it at all. 
B Did Maori Value Petroleum? 
The claimants will have to conduct extensive research to produce all evidence of 
the value of petroleum to Maori. The author understands that many iwi have 
stories and songs which refer to a dark, sticky substance widely believed to be oil. 
While fishing, Maori in the Taranaki region reported seeing a dark substance on 
the sea surface - oil slicks. The local tribes accounted for this phenomenon and the 
accompanying unusual odour by legend. Maori believed that Seal Rock, a 
submerged reef off the coast of Taranaki, was once an island of bituminous matter 
which had been ignited by a supernatural agency and had burnt down to sea 
level. 102 Other stories spoke of an atua, or spirit, which had drowned in the ocean 
and was still undergoing decomposition. 103 Reports assert that the oil and gas 
seeps were explained to be the breath and fire of the gods. 104 There are even 
allegations that southern Maori used oil as a salve for wounds. 105 
These references to the extent Maori valued petroleum are far from exhaustive. 
However these uses do appear to neatly summarise the general way Maori valued 
petroleum. 
C Taonga - Its Scope in Practice 
1 The spectrum claim 
The Tribunal's recent and controversial decision in the spectrum claim supports a 
wide definition of taonga. 106 In the Spectrum Final Report the Tribunal addressed 
a claim by Maori to the electromagnetic spectrum used to broadcast radio waves. 
The majority of the Tribunal found that the Crown had acted in breach of the 
Treaty, and recommended that Maori be given a fair and equitable share of the 
spectrum. 
The Tribunal approved the statement that Maori were aware of "various natural 
1021 D Henry, Oil Fields of New Zealand (London, 1911), 9. 
'
03From the research of Ernest Diffenbach, in 1939, cited in J D Henry, Oil Fields of New Zealand 
(London, 1911), 9. 
'
04Paydirt ' s New Zealand Petroleum Handbook (Louthean Publishing Pty Ltd, 1999). 
105Interview with Professor John Collen of the Geography Department of Victoria University of 
Wellington, 24 May 1999. Though there are no surface seepages of oil in the area of the South 
Island referred to, surface seepages can dry up over time. 
'
06Two of the three judges in the claim found that the spectrum on its own is a taonga, but it should 
be noted that the decision of the majority is the decision of the Tribunal; sec The Spectrum Report, 
above n , vii. 
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phenomena" .107 Maori explained these phenomena in mythological stories, thus 
incorporating scientific phenomena into the Maori spiritual-physical world 
philosophy .108 The Tribunal also heard evidence that Maori used the spectrum to 
communicate at a distance by shouting, a use more directly connected with the use 
of the spectrum today .109 Consequently the majority found that the spectrum itself 
is a taonga which, in conjunction with the broad right of development applied, is 
guaranteed protection under Article 2 of the Treaty. 1 t0 
The claimants could compare the petroleum resource with the electromagnetic 
spectrum. 111 Both are economically valuable and scarce. In 1840 neither Treaty 
party had the technology to exploit the spectrum or petroleum, nor did they know 
the potential the resources held. Petroleum, like the airwaves, invites complexities 
in establishing ownership.112 The Tribunal based their findings on a broad 
definition of taonga. The evidence that Maori valued and used the spectrum 
traditionally is in its nature similar to evidence the applicants in a claim to 
petroleum will present. Maori claimants have a strong argument that the 
Tribunal's definition of taonga would include petroleum. 
2 Is the spectrum of itself a taonga? 
At this point the author must qualify the Spectrum Report findings. With respect 
to the spectrum as taonga, the claimants in the Spectrum Report submitted a 
binary argument; that the spectrum itself is a taonga, of value for economic, 
cultural and social development, and/or that spectrum is a taonga as it is essential 
to and sustains the taonga of New Zealand's native language and culture. 11 3 The 
Tribunal agreed separately with both branches. 
3 Taonga by association 
However it appears that the second arm of the argument, that the preservation of 
Maori language demands protection of the spectrum, influenced the Tribunal 's 
upholding of the first argument. Throughout the report, the Tribunal stressed the 
direct relationship and influence the modern spectrum has on Maori language and 
culture. 114 The Tribunal lamented the near extinction of programmes to ensure the 
promotion of this language. The Tribunal continuously cited the report on the 
radio frequencies allocation as the basis for their findings. The Radio Frequencies 
Allocation Report found that radio frequencies are taonga only because they 
secure the place of taonga of Maori language in broadcasting. 115 
107The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 41. 
108The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 41. 
109The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 59. 
uoThe Spectrum Report, above n 24, 42. 
111 In fact, the Tribunal stated a claim to the spectrum was analogous to oil. The Spectrum Report, 
above n 24, 34. 
112The issue of ownership of petroleum resources will be addressed in further detail below. The 
spectrum cannot be restricted and one can only own rights to the spectrum; oil is migratory and 
can be extracted by any one owner of the properties which overlie the petroleum pool. In other 
words, the owner of the land does not own the oil , she or he merely has a right to extract it. 
113The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 28. 
114See generally the decision on the second limb of the claim in The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 
43-56, 65-70. 
11 5Radio Frequencies Report, above n 90, 43. 
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Maori claiming petroleum will find it difficult argue that petroleum sustains or is 
essential to the preservation of another taonga. Part VII of this paper discusses the 
argument that petroleum is part of arguably the most important of Maori taonga -
their land. This argument is slightly different from the argument that a resource 
becomes a taonga because it preserves another taonga. However, both arguments 
are to an extent creating a taonga by association. 
The dissenting judge, Savage, rejected the submission that the spectrum itself is a 
taonga. 11 6 Savage stated that it was "a difficult and dubious voyage" to go from the 
evidence of knowledge of the spectrum to finding a Treaty right. 117 While taonga 
has many definitional levels, the word must not become so indefinite as to be 
meaningless. 11 8 Taonga which have an aura of tapu and sacredness. Savage J 
found that use of the spectrum to shout at long distances, or stories of using the 
space occupied by the spectrum to snare the sun did not give the spectrum this 
sacredness. 11 9 He felt that to allow the claimant's argument would be to extend the 
meaning of taonga too far, and would enable Maori to claim almost anything as 
taonga. 
4 Taonga and development 
There is a second qualification to the Tribunal's decision that the spectrum is a 
taonga. The claimants clouded their submission that the spectrum is a taonga by 
stating that the spectrum was a taonga because of its value to Maori 
development. 120 Effectively, the claimants were arguing that the development of 
Maori, and the right of Maori to develop, are taonga themselves. Part VI has 
discussed this debate. To summarise, the finding of the Tribunal that the spectrum 
is a taonga depended on an expansive view of the right of development. 12 1 
5 The geothermal claim 
In the N gawha Report on geothermal claims, 122 the Tribunal arguably posits 
narrower requirements of what constitutes taonga. The Tribunal considered 
whether the components of the Ngawha geothermal resource - surface and 
subsurface - were taonga. The geothermal resource is a resource closely analogous 
to petroleum. 123 Both are liquid and fungible. Both are found underground, and 
both come to the surface in the form of pools. Both resources have uses which 
were not known by either Treaty partner at 1840. Both are important sources of 
energy and are highly valued economically. 
11 6Savage J did agree with the climant 's second limb of the taonga argument. See The Spectrum 
Report, above n 24, 65 . 
117The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 59. 
11 8The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 59. 
11 9The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 59. 
120The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 28. 
121 The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 41. The majority stated that the spectrum was a taonga under 
the paragraph heading: "Development". 
122Ngawha, above n 35. 
123Richard Boast The Legal Framework for Geothermal Resources - a historical study Evidence 
for the Waitangi Tribunal , 43 . 
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The claimants adduced comprehensive testimony that Maori knew not only of the 
surface thermal pools but also that these pools were connected to some larger 
body beneath the earth. 124 Extensive reference was made to the "miraculous 
healing powers" from this "spiritual source". 125 The Tribunal heard legends of 
gods travelling through the subsurface passages of the resource, of the subsurface 
areas being the heart of the taniwha, the surface pools the eyes. The evidence 
established that the iwi had exercised management and control of the resource. 126 
Maori denied that they had disposed of their rangatiratanga over the resource upon 
purported sale of the land on which lay the geothermal pools. The claimants 
presented historical documentation to prove this. 127 
D Summary 
Comparisons and conclusions are hard to draw in an area where the result depends 
on the particular facts of each case. It is not yet known to what extent the Maori 
valued and used petroleum. The claimants have in their favour evidence to support 
a claim to petroleum as taonga which the Tribunal relied on in both the Spectrum 
and the Ngawha reports. Specifically, both Tribunals gave weight to mythological 
oral stories and events relating to the resource. The Tribunals also pointed out that 
the resource and its powers were believed to be gifted by or pertain to a God. The 
Tribunal referred to the evidence that Maori protested the loss of the resource. 128 
As outlined above, all of these elements appear to accord with the Maori view and 
use of petroleum. 
However, the ritual prohibition and sanction of the geothermal resource by Maori, 
which gave it the value of a taonga, does not appear to compare favourably with 
Maori treatment of petroleum. 129 If the Tribunal finds that petroleum is a taonga, 
complete Crown ownership is arguably inconsistent with the principle of 
protection, and Crown will also have breached the principle to act in good faith 
and reasonably towards their Treaty partner. 
IX RIGHTS TO OFF-SHORE PETROLEUM 
Maori have a strong case that Crown has not extinguished aboriginal or Treaty 
rights to petroleum beneath the seabed of the continental shelf. 130 A claim to these 
petroleum resources involves three main branches. First, the claimants must 
establish that aboriginal and/or Treaty rights can be extended to areas beyond 
New Zealand's territorial limits. Second, the claimants must prove that aboriginal 
or Treaty rights to petroleum exist. Third, the Tribunal must find that these rights 
have not been extinguished. 
124Ngawha , above n 35, 21. 
125Kaumatua evidence given by Kereama Rankin to the Waitangi Tribunal, as cited in the Ngawha , 
above n 35, at 21. 
126SeeNgawha, above n 35, eh 2 at 7. 
127See Ngawha , above n 35, eh 3 at 27. 
128Maori opposed the vesting of petroleum solely in the Crown. Sec Part Xlll A below. 
J?9 - Ngawha , above n 35, 20. 
13°This will be discussed below in Part XII . 
20 
A The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf 
New Zealand's territorial limits end 12 miles from the low water mark on the 
shore. 13 1 Within this area New Zealand domestic law applies completely. Beyond 
the 12 mile zone, New Zealand's rights are determined by the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United Nations Convention on the 
Continental Shelf gives New Zealand, as a coastal state, all sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring the continental shelf and exploiting its natural 
resources. 132 The New Zealand Parliament has vested these sovereign rights in the 
Crown. 133 These are the Crown's only rights to this area. The Crown does not have 
sovereignty over the sea of the continental shelf (the High Seas) nor the airspace 
above these waters. 134 
Thus only some New Zealand legislation applies further than this 12 mile limit. 
This essay will only address those relevant to the issue. The Continental Shelf Act 
1964 (the 1964 Act), as mentioned, gives New Zealand rights to legislate for the 
exploitation of minerals under the shelf. 135 Section 4(1) of the 1964 Act states that 
the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (the CMA) applies with respect to the exploitation 
of petroleum under the shelf. 
However section 4(1) of the 1964 Act states that section 10 of the CMA does not 
apply to the shelf. Section 10 of the CMA, it will be recalled, vests ownership of 
petroleum in the Crown. The upshot of this regime? The Crown in respect of New 
Zealand has sovereign rights to exploit petroleum, but it does not own the 
petroleum in situ. 136 This point will be addressed further in relation to 
extinguishment. 
B Do Aboriginal or Treaty Rights Exist Beyond the Territorial Zone? 
1 Recognised sovereign entities 
Maori claimants will have a number of hurdles to overcome in establishing that 
aboriginal rights to the continental shelf can be recognised. First, the Crown may 
argue that Maori cannot possess any rights to the continental shelf. These 
sovereign rights are accorded by international law only to internationally 
recognised entities - usually only sovereign states. This point is discussed by 
Richard Cullen with respect to Australia. 137 Cullen argues that if the aboriginal 
tribes were granted any aboriginal rights and interests in the territorial or 
13 1The Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, s 2. 
132Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 2. This Convention was ratified in June 1964. 
133The Continental Shelf Act 1964, s 3. 
134C. John Colombos International Law of the Sea (6 ed, Longmans Green & Co Ltd, London, 
1967) 79. 
135The Continental Shelf Act 1964, s 3. 
136DE Fischer "Energy Development in New Zealand - Public ownership and public enterprise" 
(1984) NZLl 49, 50. 
137See Richard Cullen "Rights to Offshore Resources After Mabo 1992 and the Native Title Act 
1993 (Cth)" [1996] 18 Syd LR 125, 138-141 [Cullen] . The present author notes that the laws on 
jurisdiction in Australia, being a pluralist state, complicates the issue of aboriginal title and differs 
from the unitary New Zealand situation. 
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continental shelf seabed, it would be irreconcilable with the fact that states were 
denied any such rights. States were denied such rights because they were not 
internationally recognised entities, just like aboriginal peoples. 
It is the view of the present author that such an argument here is neither on point 
nor appropriate to the New Zealand situation. The issue here seems to concern 
sovereignty over the seabed rather than native rights in the seabed. The 
international legal regime gives recognised sovereign rights over the continental 
shelf to the Crown in New Zealand (and the Commonwealth in Australia). The 
granting of rights to the seabed is at the international level, to regulate between 
sovereign states. But this does not exclude nor affect aboriginal rights at a 
domestic level, as between the Crown and its Treaty partner. 
In other words, how the Crown decides to exercise their sovereign rights to those 
resources in relation to their Treaty obligations is a matter for the Crown and its 
domestic obligations. Maori do not need to be recognised internationally to have 
their protections guaranteed under the domestic law of aboriginal title or the 
Treaty. As we have seen, sovereignty and rangatiratanga can, and do, co-exist. 
Cullen also signals the argument that the international law could retrospectively 
recognise the international entity of Maori. 138 
2 Extension of the common law to the continental shelf 
Second, can these aboriginal and/or Treaty rights extend to the continental shelf 
without express legislative extension? Only rights ceded or recognised by 
international law have validity in the area of the continental shelf. Thus the 
domestic law of New Zealand does not automatically apply beyond the territorial 
zone and consequently nor does the common law of New Zealand. The Crown 
may argue that aboriginal title is given its recognition and even existence by 
common law. Therefore since the common law is not recognised in the continental 
shelf area, aboriginal rights cannot be recognised either. The Crown could run the 
same argument with respect to Treaty rights as well, as the Treaty is a part of 
domestic law. 
This argument would receive support from the comments in Mabo. The decision 
in Mabo found that the common law is crucial to the recognition of native 
property rights. 139 The decision in the Sea and Submerged Lands case found that 
the common law ends at the low water mark. 140 
However it is submitted that the Tribunal will not accept this submission. To 
uphold Crown's argument effectively means that aboriginal rights cannot exist in 
the area merely because the common law does not apply to the continental shelf. 
The claimants could argue that the domestic law in New Zealand does apply to the 
138See Cullen, above n 137, 139, referring to albeit out-of-context comments made by Moana 
Jackson in Moana Jackson "Changing Realities: Unchanging Truths" (1994) 10 AJLSoc 115. 
139See the judgmcnl of Brennan J in Mabo No 2, above n 74, 68. Sec generally Cullen, above n 
137, 138-9. 
140Per Barwick CJ, New South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 
135 CLR 337, 368-9. See also Kale Guilfoyle "The Relationship between the Crown and lhe 
Subject - Changes to the Position of the Crown as a Consequence of the Judicial Process" (1998) 
17 ABR 1, 37-38. 
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continental shelf where Parliament has extended New Zealand law in accordance 
with its Convention rights. As outlined in Part IX, the Continental Shelf Act 1964 
and the Crown Minerals Act 1991 validly apply to the continental shelf. The 
claimants could argue that the extension of this complex statutory regime to the 
continental shelf, coupled with the Crown's sovereign rights to explore and 
exploit the natural resources under the shelf, is sufficient to extend the common 
law of New Zealand to the shelf. 
It is highly arguable that Crown's sovereign rights in the shelf vest only radical 
title in the Crown, burdened by the Maori or aboriginal title. 141 The claimants 
could argue that the common law would have not effect international law, in 
disputes between states, but that it would define and regulate the status of the 
Crown's rights in the seabed vis-a-vis New Zealand's citizens. Moreover, the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991 states that all people exercising functions under the Act 
are to have regard to the Treaty of Waitangi. Does this not suffice to extend the 
Treaty and the Crown' s rights and obligations under it to the continental shelf, at 
least, again, at a domestic level? 
Finally, in R v Cote,142 Lamer C.J.C. stated that the application of the doctrine of 
aboriginal title did not depend on the introduction of common law, but instead 
was part of "a body of fundamental constitutional law .. .Jogically prior to the 
introduction of English common law". 143 It must be noted, however, that the 
doctrine arguably still relies on the common law for its recognition and its 
enforcement domestically. 
Such a finding would also be in accord with Maori expectations and 
understanding of the extent of their guarantees under the Treaty. Under the Treaty, 
the protection of Maori taonga was to be in accordance with Maori customary 
laws and beliefs. The doctrine of aboriginal law, too, takes the native peoples 
perspective into account to define aboriginal rights. It was the view of Maori that 
their sovereignty pre-1840 extended without some arbitrary cut-off point. 144 The 
idea of a 12 mile zone and an exclusive economic zone was and still is foreign to 
Maori. The lands, seas and all incidental resources are indivisible under Maori 
customary law. Thus Maori believed that the Treaty guaranteed protection of their 
rangatiratanga over taonga without territorial boundary .145 
Maori would at least have expected that this protection continue until the ends of 
Maori sovereignty which they were ceding. And as stated, the Maori view of their 
mana did not contain precise seaward boundary. In line with the principles of 
mutual benefit and good faith, when the Crown extended protection of its rights 
over resources to the shelf, they had the power, opportunity and obligation to 
extend this protection to any Maori interests to that area. 
141 See Richard Trainer Jn Re the Marlborough Sounds Foreshore Case (Honours Legal Research 
Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1998) 17. 
142(1996) 138 DLR 385. 
143R v Cote (1996) 138 DLR 385, 405. Emphasis added. 
144See Muriwhenua Fishing Report, above n 8, 184. 
1450f course, if this argument were taken to its logical end, Maori may claim aboriginal rights to 
Europe. But Maori did not sign a Treaty with the Continental nations, only the Crown on behalf of 
New Zealand. 
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It is worth noting that the Tribunal in the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries claim rejected 
a complicated Crown argument regarding international Jaw and the Treaty .146 
Crown argued that if Maori are to claim an exchange of their sovereignty over the 
offshore waters for rangatiratanga, then Maori must have been not just recognised 
but also bound by international law. Thus since the international Jaw at 1840 only 
gave state control to a 3 mile limit, the Crown must have intended that the Treaty 
only ever guaranteed rangatiratanga to that three mile limit. The Tribunal relied on 
a number of factors to reject the argument, including the fact that Maori were not 
told of this restriction, and that even Crown did not have international limitations 
at the "forefront of their minds.147 The Tribunal emphatically stated: 148 
Crown counsel ' s argument rests on the proposition that Maori in 1840 were bound by a 
so-called rule of which they had never heard , and to which , like many European nations 
where the rule had some limited urgency only, they had not assented . 
C Aboriginal Title and Treaty Rights to Off-shore Petroleum 
Of course, if the Tribunal does find that aboriginal title or Treaty title can be 
claimed to the continental shelf and subsoil, Maori must prove they have 
aboriginal or Treaty rights to the territory. In the case of petroleum, Maori again 
have two main lines of claim. 
1 As an incident of the seabed 
The claimants can also argue that their rangatiratanga over petroleum is 
guaranteed either because they have aboriginal title to the seabed which thus 
constitutes land or other properties/taonga under article 2, or that the reference to 
land under article 2 extends to land under the High Seas. A claim to the 
submerged soil of the continental shelf would be argued on the same basis as a 
claim of aboriginal title to dry land. 149 Again, much of the discussion in Part VII 
regarding aboriginal title as an interpretative instrument applies to this claim. 
The claimants have an onerous task in establishing either full aboriginal title or 
even a more limited aboriginal right to the seabed or offshore petroleum. The 
paper will now address the ways Maori could argue such a right does exist and the 
obstacles Maori may encounter. 
Aboriginal title to land involves exclusive occupation and/or use of the land prior 
to the arrival of the new sovereign power. 150 Obviously it will be near impossible 
to prove that Maori "occupied" the seabed. But Maori could assert that they have 
title to the seabed under their traditional fishing grounds. Maori could claim that 
Maori exclusively occupied and used the area above the seabed and that these 
rights gave them concomitant rights to the seabed, subsoil and any mineral 
146Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, above n 23, 5 WTR 262. 
147Many states ignored this 3 mile limit anyway. 
148Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, above n 23, 262. 
149Richard Boast "The Foreshore" Rangahaua Whanui National Theme Q (First Release, Waitangi 
Tribunal, Rangahaua Whanui Series, November 1996 6) 18 
150Delgamuukw above n 76; also Hamlet of Baker Lake and Others v Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development & Ors (1979) 107 DLR (3 ed) 513, 542. 
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resources therein. Of course, Maori would have to prove that they fished in the 
188 mile area. The Tribunal in the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report accepted that 
Maori had fished well beyond the foreshore of New Zealand. 151 Maori must also 
establish that petroleum resources were or are located under these fishing areas. 
Alternatively, Maori could claim an aboriginal right to petroleum under the 
continental shelf. Proof of an aboriginal right, however, requires evidence of 
traditional use of the resource. The present author is not aware of any Maori use 
or even knowledge of petroleum that far out to sea. 152 
It must be remembered that the doctrine of aboriginal title has its source in and 
takes into account the perspective of the native peoples. The Treaty also requires 
that tikanga Maori are incorporated into the principles. 
Maori could argue that in accordance with their holistic view of the world and its 
resources, land above water is indivisible from land under water. They do not 
view land as ending at the low water mark, or at a 12 mile cut-off point. Thus 
Maori could argue that their rangatiratanga over land protected under article 2 
includes land under the High Seas. 
A claim to offshore petroleum could of course be successful if the third role of 
development discussed in Parts V and VI is followed by the Tribunal. Failing that, 
the success of the claim depends on a very broad recognition of the principle to 
develop and the application of principles such as partnership and fiduciary 
obligation. 
(a) Other Jurisdictions 
Internationally, indigenous claims to offshore resources, other than fisheries , are 
rare. Ironically, it is more common that native tribes bring actions to stop offshore 
resource development because the development is interfering with their rights to 
fish and hunt in the area. The author knows only of two cases to date which 
specifically involve claims to the mineral resources themselves. 
A claim to seabed petroleum was made in the United States. The case involved the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 1971 (ANCSA). ANCSA was to be a 
comprehensive settlement of all claims to aboriginal title by the indigenous 
peoples of Alaska. 153 Aboriginal title was extinguished in return for land and 
monetary compensation. However whether ANCSA extinguished aboriginal 
claims to the continental shelf was unclear. The claimants in People of Village of 
Gamble v Clark1.54 attempted to stop the Secretary of Interior granting exploration 
leases for oil and gas. The claimants argued that their rights to hunt and fish in the 
sea above the continental shelf gave them concomitant rights to any mineral 
resources, including petroleum, beneath those fishing grounds. 155 The court found 
that the term "in Alaska" in the settlement extended to the continental shelf and 
15 1Muriwhenua Fishing Report, above n 8, 178. 
152It by no means follows that there is no such evidence. 
15343 USCA ss 1601-1628. 
154746 F.2d 572 (1984). 
155 People of Village of Gamble v Clark 746 F.2d 572 (1984) 573. 
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therefore ANS CA did extinguish any interests in the continental shelf. 156 Thus the 
court did not have to decide whether rights to fish and hunt allowed a valid 
concomitant of mineral resource rights. However, it is significant that the court 
did not refute the argument. 
The Federal Court of Australia recently considered the issue of aboriginal title to 
the territorial sea and seabed. 157 The applicants in Yarmirr claimed, among other 
matters, that they had native title to the minerals existing in the sea, seabed and 
subsoil of the region. 158 They claimed a right to control access to these areas and 
to trade in these resources. The claimants were given non-exclusive inalienable 
rights to fish, hunt, perform cultural rituals and to visit and protect places which 
are of cultural and spiritual importance to the community .159 But their claim to any 
mineral interests in the seabed or subsoil failed. 
The judge found that the evidence did not establish any traditional custom, 
acquisition, use or trading in minerals exercised by the indigenous claimants in 
relation to the sea, sea-bed or subsoil. 160 The decision required high evidentiary 
proof of exclusive possession, control of access and control of the resources. 161 
Even if the claimants had proven a right existed, the judge held that due to a 
complex statutory regime the Crown had taken full beneficial ownership of the 
claimed minerals. 162 
The decision in Yarmirr is not completely unhelpful to a Maori claim to offshore 
petroleum. The judge did confirm that aboriginal rights to the territorial sea and 
seabed and subsoil can exist and be recognised. A claim for exclusive access to 
and/or rights to minerals in the subsoil was technically denied on the facts, not on 
law. The arguments presented by the claimants were very vague. 163 It seems that 
the claim to seabed minerals was not the focus of their case. Furthermore, Maori 
claimants could distinguish Yarmirr on the basis that the legislative regime in 
Australia is entirely different to that in New Zealand. 164 However the case does 
reiterate that use of the resource may be crucial for a successful claim. 
156People of Village of Gamble v Clark 746 F.2d 572 (1984) 575, 579. 
157Yarmirr v Northern Territory (the Croker Island Case) Fed C of A, Olney J, 6 July 1998, 
unreported [Yarmirr]. The case has since been reported: see Yarmirr (1998) 156 ALR 370, but this 
report was unavailable to the present author at the time of writing. All paragraph references are 
therefore to the unreported judgment. 
158Yarmirr, above n 157, 4(c), 4(d). The legal regime of the territorial seabed is analogous to that 
of the continental shelf, except for the difference in Crown ownership of petroleum. 
159Yarmirr, above n 157, para 161(i), 161(iii). 
160Yarmirr, above n 157, para 158. 
161Neville Henwood "Casenote on the Croker Island Case" (1998) 3(10) Native Title News 146. 
162Yarmirr, above n 157, para 158. 
1630lney J stated that the claim of the Croker Island community to resource rights in their region 
merely appeared to encompass a claim to seabed minerals; Yarmirr, above n 157, para 158. 
164The extinguishment of any title to the seabed or subsoil was said to be achieved by the 
combined effect of the Atomic Energy (Control of Materials) Act 1946 (Cth), the Atomic Energy 
Act 1953 (Cth), the Minerals (Acquisition) Ordinance 1953, the Petroleum (Prospecting and 
Mining) Ordinance 1954, the Northern Territory (Self Government) Act 1978 (Cth) and the 
Coastal Waters (Northern Territory Title) Act 1980 (Cth). 
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2 Offshore petroleum as a taonga 
Maori could also claim that petroleum is a taonga. This would run substantially 
along the same track as the taonga-based claim to onshore petroleum. For a 
discussion of such a claim to offshore petroleum the reader is referred to Part VIII 
above. However, two points must be emphasised. 
First, it is almost certain that Maori did not use the petroleum found in slicks on 
the ocean's surface, let alone under the seabed. It is not even yet known if those 
oil slicks occurred beyond the territorial zone. However, the inclusion of the 
phenomena of oil in Maori legends and songs is just as, if not more so, apparent as 
the references to onshore petroleum. Thus the extent of the 'principle' of 
development, 165 the scope of article 2 and the persuasiveness of the judgment in 
the Spectrum Report are crucial to the success of this claim. In a similar vein lies 
the second point - proof of customary title is a matter of evidence. 166 
D Summary 
It is submitted that a claim to petroleum under the continental shelf is tenuous. 
The issues of whether such rights can extend to the continental shelf, and whether 
those rights had been extinguished will arguably favour the claimants. The result 
hangs on the proof of the aboriginal or Treaty right to petroleum. The arguments 
that title to land onshore or a non-territorial fishing right extends to land beneath 
the sea is a stretch. Indeed it will be full of complexities for both sides. 
Ultimately, as with all aspects of this claim, the answer will depend on the 
evidence, the make-up of the Tribunal and the scope of partnership on the day. 
There is some cause for optimism. Comments such as those in the Tribunal 
reports about the importance of the holistic Maori world-view provide hope. The 
rejection of the wastelands argument weakens the need for exclusive control over 
entire areas. 167 Of course, the growth of a principled approach to Treaty claims 
champions a successful claim to offshore petroleum. If the Tribunal finds that the 
principles of partnership and development extend far enough, evidence that Maori 
used or knew of the resource at 1840 will be irrelevant, 168 and a claim to offshore 
petroleum may just succeed. 
X APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT OF DEVELOPMENT TO THE 
CLAIMS 
A Maori claim to petroleum will need to claim the right to develop with respect to 
the resource. In other words, may Maori only use the resource as they did 
traditionally, pre-1840, or may they exercise their right of development and take 
165See Part VI above. 
166Paul McHugh The Aboriginal Rights of New Zealand Maori at Common Law (Cambridge, 
1987); see also Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) NZPCC 371, 382-383. 
167The Crown in Tainui argued that since Maori did not occupy all areas of New Zealand, the 
Crown acquired unburdened title to those areas upon acquisition of sovereignty. The court rejected 
this argument. See Tainui , above n 42, 
168See the discussion in Part VI above. 
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advantage of new technology to exploit the resource? As stated in Part V of this 
paper, it is generally accepted that the right exists in regard to properties specified 
in the Treaty, 169 but the position regarding unspecified properties, like petroleum, 
is unclear. 
A petroleum claim is full of contradictions. On the one hand, there is a trend to try 
and preserve Maori culture and community. It is often queried how petroleum 
development fits in with maintaining Maori beliefs and culture. Is this not 
assuring Maori assimilation into the pakeha culture? However the development of 
Maori is essential in ensuring that Maori do not stagnate. It is important that such 
considerations do not affect the analysis of the legal claims to petroleum. These 
contradictions should be developed when deciding the nature of a remedy or 
settlement. 
A Petroleum as an Incident of Land and Development 
The present author submits that with respect to the claim that petroleum is an 
incident of land, the claimants need not argue that they have a right to develop the 
resource. The author would argue that the content of a Treaty right to land is akin 
to a freehold estate. Treaty title to land includes all minerals, and the fact that 
Maori did not know of or use the resource must be irrelevant - Maori have full 
rangatiratanga over it. 
Aboriginal title entails more than a collection of specific aboriginal rights, it is an 
interest in land that is not limited to specific traditional uses. These customs and 
traditional usages of the land establish a connection to the land and are crucial to 
establish aboriginal title to that land. But the present author prefers the argument 
that these traditional usages do not determine the actual content of the title to the 
land. 110 Thus Maori rights to their land are not limited to traditional or customary 
uses. 
To limit indigenous peoples to uses of the land pre-sovereignty is inequitable and 
a breach of the Crown's fiduciary duty and status as a partner of Maori. Maori 
own full beneficial title to the land, and may use and enjoy it without any inherent 
limits based on the source of aboriginal title. All societies must adapt to survive, 
and it could not have been the intention of either Treaty partner to deny Maori the 
right to survive. 
This argument is supported by growing jurisprudence in North America on the 
nature of aboriginal title to land. 
1 Aboriginal title and the right to development 
The issue under the doctrine of aboriginal rights is also controversial. Some argue 
that the rationale for the recognition of aboriginal title as allowing exclusive use 
169The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 41. 
170See Kent McNeil "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What ' s the Connection?" (1997) 35 
Alberta L Rev 117. McNeil argues that these traditional rights may regulate aboriginal peoples 
internally, within say, a hapu or iwi, but they do no have effect externally, as between Maori and 
the Crown, beyond establishing the connection with the land in the first place. 
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and enjoyment of the land is a rationale of equality . 171 Thus in the quintessential 
American case of Mitchell v United States the Supreme Court of America 
stated: 172 
[Indian] hunting grounds were as much in [the Indians'] actual possession as the cleared 
field of the whites and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in their own way and for 
their own purposes were as much respected. 
A rationale of equality leads to the conclusion that aboriginal title should not be 
impaired in any way. Aboriginal title should give the aboriginal group complete 
rights over their land or full beneficial ownership of the land. 173 Therefore 
aboriginal title should not be frozen according to traditional uses. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in the landmark decision of Delgamuukw found 
that the uses of land held under aboriginal title are not limited to traditional 
aboriginal traditions and customs. However Lamer C.J.C. then stated that land 
held under aboriginal title "cannot be used in a manner that is irreconcilable with 
the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the group's claim 
to aboriginal title". 174 
Notwithstanding the newness of the decision in Delgamuukw, articles both 
lauding and deploring the decision are easily found. Generally the decision in 
Delgamuukw broadens the scope of aboriginal title. Flanagan argues that the 
decision effectively requires that any use of aboriginal land must not interfere 
with traditional usage. 175 Similarly McNeil argues that there should be no inherent 
limits on the use of lands held under aboriginal title. 176 
The right to land under the Treaty can be compared to reserve lands in America. 
Boast argues that Maori freehold land is not dissimilar from reservation land. 177 
On reservation land, the tribes are given full rights to the land and its resource, 
because the reservations were set up as a homeland for the native Indians, an area 
where they could exercise self-government and be self-sustaining. The tribes may 
use their lands in whatever fashion they desire, without any historically-based 
restrictions. 178 
17 1Richard Bartlett "Native Title Includes Minerals! " (1998) 17 AMPLJ 43. 
172Mitchell v United States (1835) lEd 283, 296; 34 US (9 Pet) 711, 746. 
173This has been recognised in all major jurisdictions internationally; for authority from Australia 
and Canada respectively, see Mabo No 2 (1992) 175 CLR 1, 217; Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1010, 1083; for the United States, see Shoshone, above n 18, and generally the discussion in 
Richard Bartlett "Native Title Includes Minerals" (1998) 17 AMPLJ 43, 48-49. From the African 
continent, sec the Privy Council decision in Amoclu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 
AC 399. 
174Delgamuukw, above n 76, 1088. Though Lamer CJC's findings were based on a view of the 
land and resources from the native Indian perspective, their belief that the land must be conserved 
as a living resource for all their descendants appears similar to the Maori perspective See the 
summary in Muriwhenua Fishing Report, above n 8, 173-181. 
175William Flanagan "Piercing the Veil of Real Property" (1998) 24 Queen 's L.J. 307. 
176Kent McNeil "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What 's the Connection?" (1997) 35 
Alberta L Rev 117; see also Richard Bartlett "Native Title Includes Minerals! " (1998) 17 AMPLJ 
43. 
177R P Boast The Legal Framework for Geothermal Resources: A Historical Study: A Report to the 
Waitangi Tribunal (Wellington, 1991) 54. 
178For an excellent review on the legislative regime on tribal mineral development in the United 
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2 Support from the tribunal 
The comments of the dissenting judge himself, Savage J, in the Spectrum Report 
support this argument. He comments twice on petroleum claims in his judgment. 
First he refers to a claim to petroleum as absurd due to the fact that Maori did not 
know of or value petroleum. 179 After then making clear his rejection of such a 
right to resources simpliciter, he makes an exception of Sir Apirana Ngata ' s 
claims to petroleum. Savage stated that Ngata was claiming petroleum as an 
incidence of Maori land ownership, not as a right to petroleum irrespective of any 
property right. 180 He indicates, then, that a claim to petroleum as outlined in Part 
VII, would not be absurd. Thus Maori may be able to claim petroleum regardless 
of the fact that Maori did not know or use the resource prior to 1840. 
B Petroleum as Taonga and Development 
Using the recognised Treaty principle of partnership, which encompasses mutual 
benefit and the duty to act fairly and reasonably towards one another, Maori must 
be allowed to exploit petroleum using technology not known about at 1840. In the 
Muriwhenua Fishing claim, 18 1 the Tribunal used these principles to extend the 
protection of fishing rights to include use of sophisticated detection equipment. 
The right of development also lead to an extension of traditional inshore Maori 
fishing rights to the seas beyond the continental shelf. 
The Tribunal in the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report said that implicit in the 
recognition of the Treaty right to make use of new technology is the right to take 
full advantage of it. Otherwise the Treaty would be saying that for Maori the 
Treaty rights are frozen at 1840, whereas for Crown the rights can evolve. While 
the Crown (arguably) acquired sovereignty under the Treaty, it is doubtful that 
this right of kawanatanga was intended nor expected to have such a restrictive 
effect on Maori rangatiratanga. There was to be a mutual benefit to both parties to 
the Treaty. Furthermore, the concepts of resource exploitation and economic 
development were not at all foreign to Maori before 1840. In fact, the Tribunal in 
the Muriwhenua case stated that Maori were "major developers" by 1840. 182 
Given these comments, Maori can argue that the right to oil includes the right to 
exploit and develop it. If the Tribunal takes a very broad tack, the right to enjoy 
full advantage of technology may even allow a right to develop offshore 
petroleum. This would be argued by way of an analogy to the fisheries argument -
that while Maori fished inshore (Maori has rangatiratanga over inland petroleum), 
the principle of mutual benefit allows them to extend those fisheries rights to the 
continental shelf and beyond (Maori are able under the Treaty to extend their 
States, sec Judith V Royster "Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal 
Control over Minerals" (1993) 29 Tulsa L J 541. 
179The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 63-4. 
180The Spectrum Report, above n 24, 63,4. 
18 1Muriwhenua Fishing Report above n 8, 185 
182Muriwhenua Fishing Report above n 8, 185. 
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rangatiratanga to petroleum under the continental shelf). Otherwise the success of 
a claim to offshore petroleum depends on the Tribunal finding a right to develop 
per se. 18J 
XI SEVERANCE OF SUBSURFACE RIGHTS 
One further issue should be mentioned. In the Ngawha Report, the Tribunal 
considered whether the sub-surface components of the geothermal resource were 
capable of ownership. 184 The Tribunal noted that in 1840, and prior to sale of any 
parts of the surface geothermal field, various hapu held rangatiratanga over the 
whole of the resource by virtue of their management and control of the land 
surface. However, given alienation of the land block, the claimants had no right to 
exercise management or control over the surface components for they no longer 
had rangatiratanga over them. 
The Tribunal noted that the claimants believed that ownership of the surface pools 
of the resource could not be separated from the underground resource. The 
Tribunal considered that once ownership of the surface components had been 
severed, there was no basis for allocating the right of ownership of, or 
rangatiratanga over, the whole of the sub-surface geothermal fluid to the owner of 
only one set of hotsprings or pools on the land. No one such owner or group of 
owners could validly claim the exclusive right to manage and control the 
underground fluid or to exercise a veto over its extraction and use. 185 
This decision, though by no means definitive, could cause problems in a Maori 
claim to petroleum. A claim to petroleum may be substantively different to the 
claim in the Ngawha Report. The claim to the geothermal resource was entirely 
taonga-based, and essentially the hapu in that claim were claiming rangatiratanga 
over the whole of the resource. The severance issue should be unimportant if 
Maori claim only that part of the petroleum resource on their lands or the lands 
confiscated from them before nationalisation. Due to the common law view of 
ownership of petroleum, this may mean that Maori can extract oil from under 
neighbouring non-Maori land, but it is not claimed that their rangatiratanga would 
extend to this oil until extraction. 186 
A Ownership Issues 
This issue highlights the problems of ownership of a fungible resource like 
geothermal springs and petroleum. At common law the owner of the land 
generally owns everything down to the core of the earth and up to the heaven 
within the owner's landed boundaries. 187 However with respect to a resource like 
183See Part VI above. 
184Ngawha, above n 35 , 97-98. 
185Ngawha , above n 35, 97-98. 
1860f course, due to practicalities and the lengthy time petroleum has been exploited, the 
compensation recommended by the Tribunal will not be a return of the petroleum under current 
Maori lands, whereas in the Ngawha claim the surface pools could be returned and conservation of 
the resource could be administered in accordance with tikanga Maori. See Ngawha , above n 35, 
149-158. 
187Pursuant to the maxim "cujus est solum ejus est usgue ad coelum et ad infernos". See generally 
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petroleum, the groundwater doctrine is said to apply .188 Thus the owner of land 
containing petroleum reserves did not own the petroleum until she or he extracted 
it. Consequently, that same owner could, from a mine on her or his own land, 
extract petroleum from beneath the neighbouring property and acquire valid 
ownership. 
Crown could argue, then, that the nationalisation of petroleum did not divest 
Maori of petroleum ownership, because the petroleum remained unextracted. This 
argument is without force. At common law Maori landowners (nor non-Maori 
landowners) may not have technically owned the petroleum, but the exclusive 
opportunity to extract it from their land before their neighbours and the exclusive 
control over third party access to the resource gives Maori (and non-Maori) 
landowers property rights in the petroleum. It could be deemed an inchoate 
ownership. It is this control, or rangatiratanga, which the Treaty guarantees to 
Maori landowners and the Crown allegedly took away. 
XII EXTINGUISHMENT 
It is highly likely that the Tribunal will find that any rights, Treaty or aboriginal, 
to onshore petroleum have been extinguished. An interest in offshore petroleum, 
however, may still exist. 
A General Principles of Extinguishment 
The radical title which Crown acquires as a concomitant of sovereignty 189 gives 
the Crown the power to extinguish native title. 190 Only the Crown possesses this 
right of extinguishment, and the Crown can exercise it impliedly or expressly 
through legislation or executive action. 
The intention to extinguish must be clear and plain. 191 Any ambiguities should be 
decided in favour of the native title holder. A statute which expressly states that 
any aboriginal or Treaty interests in a particular resource or area are extinguished 
will satisfy the test of clear and plain intent. 192 
However some statutes or Executive actions are not so explicit. In Wik Peoples, 
Justice Toohey affirmed the view of the court in Delgamuukw that the native title 
or right and the interest authorised by the Crown which purports to extinguish the 
Paul Grinlinton "Petroleum Law" (1995) 8(3) Otago Law Review 386, 388-9 [Grinlinton]. 
188Crommelin "The United States Rule of Capture: its Place in Australia" [1986) AMPLA 
Yearbook 265; see also RP Boast The Legal Framework for Geothermal Resources: A Historical 
Study: A Report to the Waitangi Tribunal (Wellington, 1991) 35-41 , 42. 
189Per Brennan J in Mabo , above n 78, 33 . 
190SeeMabo, above n 78, 46-50 per Brennan J, 84-85 per Dean and Gaudron JJ. 
191 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986) 1 NZLR 680, 691 per Williamson J. 
192Section 155 of the Maori Afffairs Act 1953 is an oft-cited example of an unambiguous statutory 
extinguishment of native rights: 
Except so far as may be otherwise expressly provided in any other Act, the Maori cutomary 
title to land shall not be available or enforceable by proceedings in any Court or in any other 
manner as against her Majesty the Queen or against any Minister of the Crown or any person 
employed in any department of State acting in the execution of his office. 
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native interest must not be able to co-exist to any degree. 193 In other words, if 
Crown grants rights are necessarily inconsistent with the continuation of all or 
part of the native title, that native title, to the degree that it is inconsistent, may be 
extinguished. 194 In Wik Peoples, Brennan J held up a Crown grant of freehold 
estate to a third party, 195 in the same land claimed under aboriginal title, as an 
example of inconsistency. 196 Both jurisdictions have therefore upheld this doctrine 
of extinguishment by necessary implication. 
The New Zealand government has never tried to extinguish native rights by 
granting inconsistent rights in the land to a third party, and if such a grant was 
given, there would have to be statutory authority for the grant. 197 But it appears 
that the New Zealand courts have recognised the doctrine of extinguishment by 
necessary implication. 
The courts in New Zealand clearly support a stringent test of extinguishment. 198 
Only an unambiguous deliberate act of the Crown will extinguish a right under 
aboriginal title. "Customary law does not disappear by a side wind."199 The Crown 
has the burden of proving any alleged extinguishment.200 
B Has the Right to Onshore Petroleum been Extinguished? 
The test of extinguishment must now be applied to the legislative regime 
governing petroleum. Initially relevant is the Petroleum Act 1937. The Petroleum 
Act 1937 has now been repealed. Section 3 of that Act declared all petroleum 
existing in its natural condition to be the property of the Crown.201 The provision 
applied to all petroleum on or below the surface of any land, even if that land was 
not Crown-owned. 
Section 2 of the Act defines land as all land, including that covered by water, 
within the territorial limits of New Zealand. The territorial limits of New Zealand 
extend to 12 nautical miles from the low water mark of the sea.202 To summarise, 
under the Petroleum Act 1937, Crown owned all oil and gas resources existing 
within the 12 mile territorial limit of New Zealand. 
193Wik Peoples v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
194Wik Peoples v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
195Wik Peoples v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 1, per Brennan J 69. 
196Howevcr it should be noted that not all such grants will extinguish aboriginal title; it is a matter 
of fact for each individual court. It depends on the exact scope and content of the particular grant 
and its supervising legislation, compared with the exact scope and content of any native rights to 
the land in question. See Paul Smith "Pastoral Leases and native title - what did the High Court 
say?" (1998) 3(1) Native Title News 6, 7. 
197Brookers RMA , above n 17, TWl.05. 
198Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680 (HC); see also Faulkner v Tauranga 
District Council [1996] 1 NZLR 337, 363 (HC) [Faulkner]. 
199Per Blanchard J. in Faulkner, above n 198 , 363. 
200Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680 (HC). 
201 Section 2 of the Petroleum Act defines petroleum as inclusive of "any mineral oil or relative 
hydrocarbon and natural gas existing in its natural condition in strata, but docs not include coal, 
helium, or bituminous shales, or other stratified deposits from which oil can be extracted by 
riositive distillation". 
02Pursuant to the definition of " territorial sea" in the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone 
Act 1977,s 2. 
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The Petroleum Act 1937 was repealed on 1 April 1993. The Crown Minerals Act 
1991 (the CMA) now governs the rights in_ and management of petroleum. The 
CMA contains a replacement provision which deems all naturally occurring 
petroleum to be Crown property. 203 Section 11 reserves petroleum and other 
minerals in land which has been alienated from the Crown. Again, the definition 
of land in section 2 of the CMA includes land covered by water, the foreshore and 
the seabed to the outer limits of the territorial sea. The CMA therefore maintains 
the position taken in the Petroleum Act 1937 - the Crown owns petroleum on New 
Zealand land and under New Zealand's territorial sea. 
From the outline above, it is apparent that the statutory regime does not expressly 
extinguish Maori rights to oil or gas. However the Crown will have a strong case 
that vesting ownership of petroleum resources in the Crown extinguishes native 
rights with clear and plain intention, or at least by necessary implication. 
Section 4 of the CMA states that all persons exercising functions and powers 
under the Act are to have regard to the principles of the Treaty. Maori claimants 
may wish to argue that to extinguish oil and gas resources would be a breach of 
the principles of the Treaty as required under section 4. Therefore it could be 
presumed that Crown did not intend to extinguish any aboriginal or Treaty rights 
with the Act.204 
However this argument runs into a hurdle in the Petroleum Act 1937. This Act 
was the original source of extinguishment of petroleum resources, and the Act did 
not require any consideration of the Treaty. Although the Petroleum Act 1937 no 
longer is in force, aboriginal or Treaty rights would probably not been revived on 
its repeal. Whether native rights survive or hibernate during the reign of 
extinguishing provisions remains to be seen.205 
C Has The Right to Offshore Petroleum Been Extinguished? 
The legislation relevant to petroleum under the continental shelf was examined in 
Part IX above. The investigation established that Crown has sovereign rights over 
the continental shelf and its subsoil for the purpose of exploration and exploitation 
of its resources. It was also found that all bar one the regulatory provisions of the 
CMA applied to the mining of petroleum on the continental shelf seabed. Only 
section 10 of the CMA does not apply, the section that vests ownership of 
petroleum in the Crown. In summary, the Crown has sovereign rights to to exploit 
petroleum, but the Crown does not own the petroleum in its natural state. The 
Crown may issue permits to third parties to explore and exploit the offshore 
petroleum. 
203Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 10. This section also vests property in gold, silver and uranium in 
the Crown. 
204This argument should not be confused with the argument that extinguishment of any rights to 
petroleum is in breach of the Treaty. There is a subtle difference in the tack of the argument; the 
argument above is not that extinguishment was a breach, but rather that the Crown did not intend 
to extinguish any native interests in oil because extinguishment would constitute a breach of the 
Treaty pursuant to section 4 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991. 
205For discussion on this point and an examination of extinguishment in general see Richard Ogden 
" Wik Peoples v State of Queensland" (1998) 28 VUWLR 341 [ Ogden]. 
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The status of the Crown's relationship to petroleum under the continental shelf 
raises a reasonably difficult issue with respect to extinguishment. The advanced 
argument goes beyond the scope of this paper. The present author proposes to 
introduce the basic considerations, and will refer the reader to articles which 
contain a more comprehensive treatment of the issues. 
The claimants have a very strong case that the mere fact that the Crown has 
sovereignty over petroleum on the continental shelf is not sufficiently clear 
extinguishment of aboriginal or Treaty rights to petroleum. After all, surely 
Crown sovereignty over land on the territorial lands of New Zealand did not and 
does not extinguish aboriginal or Treaty rights there. Jn Re Marlborough 
Sounds,206 Hingston J found that when the Crown assumed sovereignty in 1840, 
any Maori interest in the seabed was in no way disturbed, diminished or 
extinguished. Hingston J found that confiscatory legislation must clearly and 
unequivocally deal with extinguishment. The decision is currently under appeal to 
the Maori Appellate Court. 
The claimants may, however, face a bigger issue. The Crown could argue that by 
granting leases to third parties for the exploitation of petroleum, the Crown has 
extinguished aboriginal and/or Treaty rights, either by clear intention or necessary 
implication. 
In Mabo, Brennan J stated that "a Crown grant which vests in the grantee an 
interest inland which is inconsistent with the continued right to enjoy a native title 
in respect of the same land necessarily extinguishes the native title."207 Brennan J 
found that a Crown grant of a freehold estate to a third party would necessarily 
extinguish native title. A grant of a lesser interest may not extinguish aboriginal or 
Treaty title. Here Brennan J speculated that a lease to prospect for minerals may 
not be sufficiently inconsistent with a native interest so as to extinguish it.208 
Its arguable that the Tribunal, and the courts, would not allow an inconsistent 
Crown grant to extinguish aboriginal or Treaty title to land. As mentioned above, 
the law of New Zealand does not allow native rights to be taken away by a 'side 
wind ' . 
However the issue here is not about extinguishment of native title to the whole 
seabed, but extinguishment of a right within that native title - the right to the 
petroleum. Moreover, in this situation the grant of exploration or exploitation 
rights has statutory authority. In addition, a grant effectively allows the third 
party, say Generic Mining Ltd (GM), full rights to the petroleum. GM has no 
proprietary rights in the petroleum in situ, but does have exclusive access to the 
resource. 209 Section 31 of the CMA states that the permit holder who lawfully 
obtains minerals becomes the owner of those minerals. This arguably gives GM 
an inchoate right of ownership of the oil which becomes a concrete proprietary 
206/n Re Marlborough Sounds (1997) unreported , MLC, 22A Nelson MB l , Hingston J. 
207Per Brennan J in Mabo No 2, above n 78, 68. 
208Per Brennan Jin MaboNo 2, above n 78, 69. 
209For the proprietary nature of mining leases, sec Michael Crommelin "The Legal Character of 
Resource Titles" (1998) 17 AMPLJ 57. 
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interest upon the oil's extraction.210 The claimants must argue that this is not 
extinguishment of their rights to offshore petroleum by necessary implication. 
Maori could argue that the Crown did not intend that the Petroleum Act 1937 or 
Crown Minerals Act 1991 should extinguish aboriginal and treaty rights to the bed 
of the continental shelf. In 1937 Crown would not have contemplated a claim by 
Maori to the seabed, let alone have legislated for the purpose of extinguishing 
such a claim. However, Brennan J did comment that the actual intention of the 
grantor in granting rights inconsistent with native rights is irrelevant. If the effect 
of the grant is irreconcilably inconsistent with the native right or title, then 
whether the grantor intended to extinguish the native right does not matter.211 
The present author is reluctant to accept this reasoning. Brennan J's comments do 
pertain to a pluralist situation and related to grants not according to a specific 
statutory power. Further Australian decisions have addressed the extinguishment 
of aboriginal title by Crown grant.2 12 In Wik Peoples the judges expressed 
differing views about whether it is the intention or the effect of the grant which is 
relevant. 213 There are further issues to consider, like whether native title revives 
after the grant expires.214 The recent Native Title Act 1993 in Australia affects the 
issue.2 15 The question is indeed complex. 
XIII COMPENSATION 
It has fallen, it has collapsed, 
The Treaty of Waitangi! 
It is perhaps the work of the Labour Government 
Which has altered the Laws 
Which has absorbed all our money, 
Which is confiscating our lands! 
And so I weep. Au! Alas! 2 16 
Whether the Crown has an obligation to obtain the consent of the relevant Maori 
210See generally Deborah Fischer "Energy Development in New Zealand - Public ownership and 
fublic enterprise" (1984) NZLJ 49, 50. 
-
11 Per Brennan J in Mabo No 2, above n 78, 68. 
212See Wik Peoples v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 1; also Mineralogy Pty Ltd v NNTT and 
others (10 December 1997) unreported, Federal Court of Australia, per Carr J. 
213See P Hunter "Wik Decision: Unnecessary Extinguishmenl" (1997) 3(1) Native Tille News 1; 
also Stephen Lloyd "Extinguishment, Revival and Minerealogy" (1998) 3(7) Native Tille News 
88. 
2 14The reader is again referred Lo Ogden, above n 205, for a comprehensive review of these issues. 
215IL is interesting to note that under the Native Title Act 1993, compensation is payable for 
interference with native Litle due Lo the grant of a mining lease. Category C stipulates that native 
title is not extinguished by the lease and reverts if the lease expires. See R T M Whipple 
"Assessing Compensation under the Provisions of the Native Tille Act 1993" (1997) Native Title 
News 30, 31. 
2 16Translation of a haka to be performed by Ngati Porou upon the visit of the Minister of Mines in 
1937, Webb, to discuss the issue of Petroleum royalties. The haka expresses Ngati Porou 's feelings 
about the government and the developments regarding petroleum. The visit never took place. Cited 
in Dr Robyn Anderson "Goldmining: Policy, Legislation, and Administration" Rangahaua Whanui 
Series Theme N al 90-91. 
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in order to validly extinguish aboriginal or Treaty rights is unclear. Nor have the 
courts decided whether the Crown must compensate for the extinguishment of 
aboriginal or Treaty rights. However the task of the Tribunal is to recommend 
whether compensation should be provided.2 17 The present author reiterates that the 
Crown is not bound by the Tribunal's recommendations.218 
Generally the Tribunal will recommend compensation if the Crown has 
extinguished Maori rangatiratanga over a property guaranteed to Maori by the 
Treaty, where Maori did not willingly or knowingly agree or relinquish that 
right.2 19 The Tribunal will look at the Maori assumptions of control and mana over 
the resource over time. A willingness to share does not show relinquishment of 
this mana.220 This may be relevant to a claim to petroleum if it is proven that 
Maori entered into private agreements with Pakeha for the extraction of oil on 
Maori land.221 It follows then that a statutory bar to compensation may also be 
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. 
The Tribunal has stated that the Crown should only extinguish Treaty rights 
without consent in exceptional circumstances as a last resort in the national 
interest.222 As an aside, the present author speculates whether the nationalisation of 
petroleum in the face of impending world war qualifies as a last resort. While the 
nationalisation of oil was in part motivated by thoughts of regional security, 
history shows that nationalisation was more influenced by qualms about the 
collapse of New Zealand's local industry.223 The present author merely queries 
whether these circumstances qualify as "exceptional" and whether nationalisation 
qualifies as the only resort. 
A No Free Consent by Maori 
There is extensive evidence that Maori objected to the passing of the Petroleum 
Act 1937.224 In that same year, Ngati Porou petitioned the proposed legislation. 
The iwi complained that the Act took away their rights, and they demanded that in 
return for allowing prospectors on to tribal land, they receive a percentage of the 
royalties on any oil discovered there. The government passed the Act despite 
Maori objections, and promised to address the royalty issue later. The issue was 
later discussed, but no change to the Act was made. Some see these events as a 
case where government promised to provide a royalty to Maori and failed to do 
so. Thus the events and legislation could be viewed as a breach of the Treaty. 
Sir Apirana Ngata was vociferous in his condemnation of the taking of petroleum 
by the Crown. He referred to the common law recognition that Maori have full 
ownership of their lands, and that this included the rights to oil and gas. Ngata 
2 17The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6(3). 
21 8 The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6(3). 
219 Whanganui River Report, above n 36, 266-268. 
220 Whanganui River Report, above n 36, 266-268. 
22 1Dr Robyn Anderson "Goldmining: Policy, Legislation, and Administration" Rangahaua Whanui 
Series Theme N, 90-91. 
222Waitangi Tribunal The Turangi Township Report (Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1995) 
sec 1.5 .2(3). 
223For a history on the New Zealand petroleum regime, sec Grinlinton, above n 187. 
224See generally Grinlinton, above n 187, 390-92. 
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stressed that these rights were guaranteed and protected by the Treaty, and should 
not be removed without compensation.22' 
B No Consultation Apparent 
The conclusions of the Solicitor-General on whether the Petroleum Bill breached 
the Treaty are noteworthy. He concluded that the Bill treated "equally all subjects 
of His Majesty" and therefore did not breach the Treaty.226 But it is submitted that 
the Solicitor-General focused on article 3 of the Treaty, ignoring the special rights 
Maori hold under article 2. Either way, his actions could hardly discharge the 
obligation of the Crown to consult with Maori pursuant to the principles of the 
Treaty. 
C Statutory Bars to Compensation 
1 Onshore petroleum 
The Petroleum Act 1937 specifically barred any compensation payable to anyone 
in respect of any oil or gas taken by the Crown pursuant to that Act.227 The Crown 
Minerals Act 1991, which repealed the Petroleum Act 1937,228 does not contain an 
equivalent provision. Thus, a statutory bar to compensation for extinguishment of 
territorial petroleum rights no longer exists. 
2 Offshore petroleum 
Section 4 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 applies the provisions of the Crown 
Minerals Act 1991 to petroleum under the continental shelf seabed (with the 
exception of section 10 regarding Crown ownership of petroleum). Therefore, in 
the event that petroleum rights under the aforementioned 188 mile zone are 
extinguished, compensation is also no longer barred either. 
The claimants must then prove that the bar contained in the now-repealed 
Petroleum Act 1937 did not survive that Act, and has no effect on a claim to 
compensation today.229 
D Compensation despite Statutory Bar 
In recent Crown settlements, the Crown has included payment of compensation 
even though relevant statutes had historically barred the right to compensation. 
The Waikato Raupatu Deed of Settlement awarded compensation to Tainui 
regarding the unjust confiscation of Tainui land under the New Zealand 
Settlements Act 1863 (the Settlements Act). Section VI of the Settlements Act 
barred the predecessors of Tainui claimants from claiming any compensation for 
confiscated land. Nonetheless, compensation was paid, and paid to the 
225See Grinlinton, above n 187, 391. 
226Letter dated 16 November 1937 from the Solicitor-General to Hon Minister of Mines cited in 
Grinlinton, above n 187, 390. 
227Petroleum Act 1937, s 39(5). 
228See Part IX above. 
2290f course, in a court claim the claimants must also prove that a right to compensation for 
extinguishment of aboriginal or Treaty rights exists at all. 
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descendants of those Maori who historically had been statutorily denied any 
compensation. Although such behaviour is likely the result of political obligation 
than legal obligation, it must be remembered that Treaty issues are as much 
political as legal. 
E Recent Developments Regarding Compensation 
In a claim to the Tribunal, it is not necessary to investigate whether the Crown 
must either obtain free consent from Maori or award compensation to validly 
extinguish aboriginal or Treaty rights.230 Yet it is worth acknowledging some of 
the significant comments from both the courts and the Tribunal on compensation 
for extinguishment or breach of aboriginal and Treaty rights. Not only do these 
developments show a greater willingness of the courts to compensate for 
extinguishment of native rights, they also strengthen the argument that the 
Tribunal will recommend redress in a claim to petroleum. 
In the Court of Appeal case of Te Runanganui o Te Jka Whenua, President Cooke 
concurred with the view originally set down by the Privy Council that aboriginal 
title cannot be "extinguished otherwise (at least in times of peace) than by the free 
consent of the native occupiers". 231 Cooke went onto say:232 
An extinguishment of native title by less than fair conduct or on less than fair terms will 
be likely to be a breach of the fiduciary duty widely and increasingly recognised as 
falling on the colonising power. . .it may be that the requirement of free consent has at 
times to yield to the necessity of the compulsory acquisition of land or other property for 
specific public purposes which is recognised in many societies; but there is an 
assumption that, on any extinguishment of the aboriginal title, proper compensation will 
be paid. 
Cooke's statements were obiter. Nonetheless, Cooke's description of free consent 
as a requirement is strongly significant. While the majority in Mabo denied any 
requirement of consent, two judges, Deane and Gaudron JJ, affirmed the 
comments cited from R v Symonds.233 
It has been the practice of the US government to negotiate and obtain consent 
from native bands before extinguishing the band 's rights. In addition, the 
government has shown a willingness to provide compensation, including in the 
valuation any minerals found on or under the land. Of course, such behaviour is a 
result not of law, but of political policy. 
The case law in America uses the fiduciary relationship of the Federal 
Government and native peoples to establish an obligation to compensate if rights 
230It appears that at present, the Crown is under no obligation to do either. 
231 Te Runanganui o Te lka Whenua Inc Sac v A-G [1994] 2 NZLR 20, 23-24, referring lo the case 
of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) NZPCC 371,384, citing R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387, 390. 
The author again notes that when the Crown first took ownership of petrolem, the world was 
facing war. Would this constitute a state of non-peace sufficient to vitiate the need for free 
consent, if such is required at all? The present author doubts that this principle would apply to 
New Zealand two years before war began. 
232Te Runanganui o Te lka Whenua Inc Sac v A-G [1994] 2 NZLR 20, 23-24, emphasis added. 
233See Mabo (No 2), above n 78, 92, approving R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387, 390. 
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are extinguished. The present author reiterates that there are differences between 
the two jurisdictions,234 the reasoning appeals. President Cooke seems to agree, 
emphasising the need for fairness in Crown actions, this need stemming from the 
fiduciary relationship between the two Treaty partners. This principle has been 
discussed at length in Part IV above. The same comments apply here. 
The very fact that the government expressly barred compensation for the taking of 
petroleum in the Petroleum Act 1937 implies that the government believed such a 
claim could be successfully made. The absence of that same bar in the Crown 
Minerals Act 1991 further implies that compensation may now be claimed. The 
words of Tribunal itself provide further support for such a view. In 1990 the 
Tribunal presided over the interim hearing concerning the disposal of Crown 
interests in the petroleum resource. In a memorandum the Tribunal stated:235 
We are of the opinion however that the claimants have a case to be argued, either to the share 
of the resource or to compensation from that resource as a local asset within the de facto 
control of the Crown. 
XIV CONCLUSION 
Neither the Waitangi Tribunal nor the New Zealand courts have addressed a claim 
of aboriginal or Treaty rights to petroleum. It is difficult to accurately predict how 
successful such claims will be. 
It is the present author 's view that there is enough gas in the tank to sustain a 
Maori claim to petroleum. The claimants have a strong argument that they had 
Treaty rights to petroleum within their lands. Applying the established principles 
of partnership and protection, and the duties and rights of both Crown and Maori 
encompassed by these principles, the vesting of petroleum in the Crown by virtue 
of the Petroleum Act 1937 was and is inconsistent with the Treaty and its 
principles. The recent decision on the spectrum claim supports a finding that 
petroleum is a taonga. The success of this submission will depend on the evidence 
adduced and how the Tribunal define the scope of taonga and development. 
It is the present author's view that a claim to offshore petroleum is full of 
complexities and sub-issues which fudge the claim's focus. If a claim to offshore 
petroleum is taken before the Tribunal, it will indeed be interesting, even if the 
result does not favour the claimants. It is the timid view of the present author that 
such a claim, either based on taonga or as an incident of the seabed, is not strong. 
However it must again be mentioned that the success of a claim to petroleum 
depends on factors which are not known at this stage. Extensive research may turn 
up useful evidence that Maori used petroleum extensively. A factor more 
uncontrollable, however, is the Tribunal itself. A claim to petroleum may be the 
234Particularly, the US government owes a strict fiduciary duty to the native peoples akin to a trust, 
moreso than in Canada or New Zealand. The constitutional affirmation of native rights in Canada 
and the US, the US constitutional takings provision and ability to review legislation are also 
notably absent in New Zealand. 
235Memorandum from the Waitangi Tribunal Concerning the Disposal of Maui Gas Rights to the 
Hon. KT Wetere Minister of Maori Affairs and others, Wai 143, 29 June 1990, 4. 
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first time the Tribunal assesses a claim which extends the norms and shakes the 
status quo a little since the spectrum claim. Whether the Tribunal will continue 
down a more principles-based path of Treaty jurisprudence remains to be seen. 
Finally, the author submits that in deciding the validity of a claim to petroleum, 
the implications and inconveniences which may follow from a favourable 
judgment should in no way affect the legal basis for the claim. The question as to 
what the Tribunal and the government in any settlement are trying to redress must 
be further developed when redress is being considered, but not when the legal 
claim is being considered. 
The Tribunal has proven to be an authoritative and competent judicial body. If 
there is one certainty in a claim to petroleum, it is that the Tribunal will deal with 
it thoroughly and neutrally. In terms of a possible settlement with Crown, the 
issue will be decided by politics. In light of the apparent boldness of the Tribunal 
to tackle new issues, the author takes the optimist's view of a Maori claim to 
petroleum; the tank, it is submitted, is half full. 
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1. PREAMBLE 
1.1 This First Amended Statement of Claim ("this Claim") amends the 
original Statement of Claim dated 14 May 1991 and registered with 
the Waitangi Tribunal as Wai 201 ("the original Claim"). 
1.2 This first amended statement of claim amends by addition only and 
does not replace any provision of the original Claim. 
1.3 The traditional territory of the iwi ofNgati Kahungunu is that area on 
the east coast of the North Island stretching from the Mahia Peninsula 
in the north to Cape Palliser and Lakes Onoke and Wairarapa in the 
south and inland to the south-eastern shores of Lake Waikaremoana, 
and to the Kaweka, Kaimanawa, Ruahine, Tararua and Rimutaka 
Ranges to the west, and include all inland and coastal fisheries 
adjacent to the said area. 
2. THE CLAIM 
2.1 The claimants say their claim falls within one or more of the matters 
referred to in section 6(1) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, namely; 
(a) each of the claimants are Maori; and 
(b) each of the claimants claim they have been prejudicially 
affected, or are likely to continue to be affected by : 
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(i) ordinances of the General Legislative Council of New 
Zealand, and/or the provincial Legislative Council of 
New Munster and/or provincial ordinances and/or acts-
passed on or after the 6th of February 1840; and/or 
(ii) by regulations, orders, proclamations, notices or other 
statutory instruments made, issued or given at times on 
or after the 6th of February 1840 under the ordinances 
or acts referred to in paragraph (i) above; and/or 
(iii) by policies, practices (some of which are no longer in 
force) adopted by or on behalf of the Crown, and by 
policies or practices proposed to be adopted by or on 
behalf of the Crown; and/or by acts, omissions on and 
after the 6th of February 1840 with regard to proposed 
acts and/or proposed omissions, by and on behalf of 
the Crown including but not limited to the following 
particulars : 
PARTICULARS OF THIS FIRST AMENDED CLAIM 
Petroleum, Natural Gas and Other Mineral Resources 
Specifically the claimants claim that all petroleum, natural gas and 
other mineral resources howsoever constituted, in whatsoever form 
and located within the land based and sea based rohe including, 
without seaward boundary, the seabed adjacent to the land based rohe 
of Ngati Kahungunu ("the resources") are taonga tuku iho of Ngati 
Kahungunu, and are protected as such by the Treaty of Waitangi for 
the benefit ofNgati Kahungunu. 
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3.2 Extent of above rights: 
Pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi and/or the doctrine of aboriginal 
title, Ngati Kahungunu are guaranteed Tino Rangatiratanga over 
Ngati Kahungunu taonga located within the Ngati Kahungunu rohe so 
long as it is their wish to retain the same. 
Ngati Kahungunu have never relinquished Tino Rangatiratanga over 
the resources. 
3.3 Breach of rights: 
Failure by the Crown, or its agents, through certain ordinances, Acts, 
regulations, orders, proclamations, notices, instruments, policies, 
practices, acts or omissions to actively protect Ngati Kahungunu 
Treaty and aboriginal rights to the resources by but not limited to : 
(a) the failure to recognise that the resources are protected as 
taonga ofNgati Kahungunu under the Treaty of Waitangi ; and 
(b) the failure to recognise that Ngati Kahungunu had aboriginal 
title to the resources as at 1840; and 
( c) in respect of the oil and gas resources, the failure to consult 
with Ngati Kahungunu in regard to the introduction of the 
Petroleum Act 1937 and the Crown Minerals Act 1991 ("the 
legislation"); and 
( d) the failure to acknowledge that the legislation was/is contrary 
to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi ; and 
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(e) the failure to compensate Ngati Kahungunu after purporting to 
assume ownership and control of the resources through the 
legislation; and 
(f) the consequent exploitation of the resources by third parties 
after the enactment of the legislation; and 
(g) the failure to ensure that Ngati Kahungunu continue to control 
and manage the resources in accordance with rights guaranteed 
under the Treaty of Waitangi and the doctrine of aboriginal 
title. 
4. FINDINGS SOUGHT 
4.1 The claimants seek the following findings : 
(a) that the Treaty of Waitangi guarantees to Ngati Kahungunu 
Tino Rangatiratanga, which includes rights analogous to 
ownership rights to Ngati Kahungunu in respect of the 
resources ; 
(b) that Ngati Kahungunu retains ownership of the resources; 
and/or that Ngati Kahungunu had and retains 
aboriginal/customary title to the resources; 
( c) that the resources may not be exploited by third parties 
without the prior consent of Ngati Kahungunu; 
( d) that the right to manage the resources is, in terms of the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, vested in Ngati 
Kahungunu; 
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( e) that compensation be made by the Crown for loss of benefits 
suffered by Ngati Kahungunu from the resources; and, 
(f) such further findings as the Tribunal deems just. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The claimants reserve the right to make submissions on 
recommendations as the claim progresses. 
6. FURTHER AMENDMENTS TO THE CLAIM 
The claimants ask that leave be given to amend this Amended 
Statement of Claim following the preparation of research reports and 
hearings which will both identify and refine claims and issues arising 
therein. 
DATED at Wellington this Monday, the 21'1 day of December 1998 
TO: 
AND TO: 
AND TO: 
RM Rudland 
Counsel for the Claimants 
The Registrar, Waitangi Tribunal 
The Crown Law Office (Solicitor-General) 
Office of Treaty Settlements (The Director) 
Minister of Energy 
Minster in charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations 
Simpson Grierson, Wellington for WestTech / Enerco Joint 
Venture 
Wairoa District Council (The Chief Executive) 
Napier Regional Council (The Chief Executive) 
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TW APPENDIX ~ 
TEXT OF THE TREAlY OF WAITANGI 
A. FIRST SCHEDULE TO THE TREAlY OF WAITANGI ACT 1975 
(THE TEXT IN ENGLISH) 
HER MAJESTY VICTORIA Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland regarding with Her Royal Favour the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New 
Zealand and anxious to protect their just Rights and Property and to secure to them 
the enjoyment of Peace and Good Order has deemed it necessary ill consequence of 
the great number of Her Majesty's Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand 
and the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in 
progress to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorised to treat with the 
Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's Sovereign authority 
over the whole or any part of those islands-Her Majesty therefore being desirous to 
establish a settled form of Civil Government with a view to avert the evil consequences 
which must result from the absence of the necessary Laws and lbstitutions alike to the 
native population and to Her subjects has been graciously pleased to empower and to 
authorise me William Hobson a captain in Her Majesty's Royal Navy Consul and 
Lieutenant Governor of such parts of New Zealand as may be or hereafter shall be 
ceded to her Majesty to invite the confederated and independent Chiefs of New 
Zealand to concur in the following Articles and Conditions. 
ARTICLE THE FIRST 
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the 
separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation 
cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the 
rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation of Individual Chiefs 
respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their 
respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof. 
ARTICLE THE SECOND 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and 
Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and 
other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their 
wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United 
Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption 
over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as 
may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her 
Majesty to treat with them in that behalf. 
ARTICLE THE THIRD 
In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives 
of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges 
of British Subjects. 
W. HOBSON Lieutenant Governor. 
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Now therefore We the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of 
New Zealand being assembled in Congress at Victoria in Waitangi and We the 
Separate and Independent Chiefs of New Zealand claiming authority over the Tribes 
and Territories which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully 
to understand the Provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in 
the full spirit and meaning thereof: in witness of which we have attached our signatures 
or marks at the places and the dates respectively specified. 
Done at Waitangi this Sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord One thousand 
eight hundred andJorty. 
[Here follow signatures, dates, etc.] 
(THE TEXT IN MAORI) 
Ko Wikitoria, te Kuini o Ingarani, i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga 
Hapu o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga, me 
to ratou wenua, a kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hok:i kua 
waleaaro ia he mea tilea kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira hei leai walearite k:i nga Tangata 
maori o Nu Tirani-kia waleaaetia e nga Rangatira maori te Kawanatanga o te Kuini ki 
nga wahileatoa o te Wenua nei me nga Motu-na te mea hold he tokomaha ke nga 
tangata o tona Iwi Kua noho ki tenei wenua, a e haere mai nei. 
Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia walearitea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e 
puta mai ki te tangata Maori ki te Pakeha e noho ture kore ana. 
Na, kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopibona he Kapitana i te Roiara 
Nawi hei Kawana mo nga wahi leatoa o Nu Tirani e tukua aianei, amua atu kite Kuini 
e mea atu ana ia ki nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani me era 
Rangatira atu enei ture lea korerotia nei. 
' Ko te Tuatahi 
Ko nga Rangatira o te Waleaminenga me nga Rangatira leatoa hoki ki hai i uru k:i 
taua wakaminenga ka tulcu rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu-te 
Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua. 
Ko te Tuarua 
Ko te Kuini o lngarani lea wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu-ki nga 
tangata leatoa o Nu Tirani te lino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou leainga me o 
ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o te Waleaminenga me nga Rangatira 
leatoa atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te 
Wenua-ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te 
Kuini hei leai hoko mona. 
Treaty of Waitangi 
Ko te Tuatoru 
Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaaetanga lei te Kawanatanga o te Kuini-
Ka tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Trrani ka tukua ki a 
ratou nga tikanga katoa rite tahi lei ana mea lei nga tangata o Ingarani. ' . 
(Signed) WIWAM HOB.50N, 
Consul and Lieutenant-Governor. 
Na ko matou ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o nga hapu o "Nu Tirani ka 
huihui nei lei Waitangi ko matou hoki ko nga Rangatira o Nu Trrani ka kite nei i te 
ritenga o enei kupu, ka tangohia ka wakaaetia katoatia e matou, koia ka tohungia ai o 
matou ingoa o matou tohu. 
Ka meatia tenei lei Waitangi i te ono o nga ra o Pepueri i te tau kotahi mano, e 
waru rau e wa te kau o to tatou Ariki. 
Ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga. 
B. ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT IN MAORI: (from the Royal 
Commission on Social Policy 1988, The April Report, Vo! ill part 1, pp 211, 212) 
ARTICLE TIIE FIRST 
The Chiefs of the Confederation and all the chiefs who have not joined that 
Confederation give absolutely to the Queen of England forever the complete 
government over their land. 
ARTICLE TIIE SECOND 
The Queen of England agrees to protect the Chiefs, the sub-tribes and all people of 
New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages 
and all their treasures. But on the other hand, the Chiefs of the Confederation and all 
the Chiefs will sell land to the Queen at a price agreed to by the person owning it and 
by the person buying it (the latter being appointed by the Queen as her purchase 
agent). 
ARTICLE THE THIRD 
For this agreed arrangement therefore, concerning the Government of the Queen, 
the Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and will give 
them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England. 
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